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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY                                          When the Smoke Clears
In November 1994, Arizona voters raised the tax on alltobacco products in the state by approving Proposition
200, the Tobacco Tax and Health Care Act.1 The revenue
generated by the tax increase was dedicated to three primary
purposes: health care for the medically needy, tobacco use
prevention, and research on tobacco-related diseases.  
Between 1995 and 1999, the new tobacco tax raised a total
of approximately $520 million. The Arizona Legislature has
spent portions of the money, creating dozens of programs
and line-item expenditures that have provided more than
150,000 medical services. Large amounts of the revenue – 
as much as $100 million per year – have gone unspent, 
however.
In November 1998, four years to the month after Arizona
passed Proposition 200, a lengthy legal battle between the
tobacco industry and the Attorneys General from 46 states
ended when a historic multi-state settlement agreement 
was signed. The largest U.S. tobacco companies agreed to
pay out more than $200 billion over 25 years in exchange
for the states’ promise not to pursue future liability lawsuits
against the tobacco companies.  
Based on the settlement’s disbursement formula, Arizona’s
portion of the agreement is estimated to be roughly $3 bil-
lion, paid out over two and a half decades. In contrast to 
the voter-approved Proposition 200, however, the multi-state
tobacco agreement is silent on how individual states can
spend their settlement dollars – the states face no restric-
tions on how the money can be spent.
In late 1998, a dialogue was quickly initiated over how to
spend Arizona’s share of the multi-state tobacco settlement.
However, few policy makers were looking upon the four-year
old Proposition 200 as a potential learning experience for
the state. Thus, this research project was initiated in early
1999 with two primary questions: 
• What has happened with the voter-approved Proposition
200 funds since passage in 1994?
• What lessons does the implementation of Proposition
200 offer Arizona for how it might spend its portion of
the settlement agreement? 
WHAT HAS HAPPENED WITH PROPOSITION
200 SINCE PASSAGE IN 1994?
 The spirit and letter of Proposition 200 have
been violated.
Despite several early attempts in the Arizona Legislature to
modify the framework for where the newly-passed Proposi-
tion 200 money would go, the four accounts established in
the original voter-approved Tobacco Tax and Health Care Act
have been maintained as intended since 1995. However,
large sums of Proposition 200 revenue – on average $90
million annually – have gone unallocated and unspent by
the Legislature. In addition, interviews conducted for this
project indicate that two technical provisions of the Act have
likely also been violated. The first provision in question pro-
hibits the Legislature from using the new revenue to
“supplant” previously existing health care services funded by
the state, and the second disallows the new funds from being
“subject to appropriation.” Despite ambiguity and questions
about the intent of both provisions, it appears that the Legis-
lature has both supplanted and appropriated Proposition
200 tobacco tax revenues.
 Politics and the lack of an overarching state
health policy have caused large unspent carry
forward balances and created a “shotgun blast”
of programs to address a variety of perceived
healthcare needs.
The spending of Proposition 200’s revenue began very
slowly in the largest of the four accounts created (the Med-
ically Needy Account) for a variety of reasons. Although
politics and special interests have caused a significant
increase in spending in the Medically Needy Account in recent
years, the lack of a state health care needs assessment and the
absence of overarching state health policy goals have caused
a scattering of the funds to dozens of programs. In addition,
despite the creation of many programs, large amounts of
money are still not being spent out of the Medically Needy
Account, and the Joint Legislative Budget Committee is pro-
jecting large balances through fiscal year 2005.
i
1 In addition to raising taxes on smokeless tobacco products, Proposition 200
included a 40-cents per pack increase on cigarettes.
 Data and evaluation information regarding 
programs in Prop. 200’s Medically Needy
Account are inconsistent, making it difficult 
to assess performance.
Although this research project was never intended as a
performance evaluation of the Medically Needy Account and
its programs, an attempt to examine the Account in aggre-
gate was complicated by the wide variety of programs and
inconsistent data available from them. In the final analysis,
though access to certain health care services has increased,
few conclusions can be drawn about the quality of the pro-
grams operating within the Medically Needy Account. In
addition, evaluations are sorely lacking, as the only statutorily
mandated “evaluation” is conducted by Department of Health
Services upon four of its own programs. Data collection needs
to be taken more seriously, and evaluation should be removed
to a private – or at least independent – entity outside of the
agencies administering programs.
 Access to health care services has been
increased.
Although individual program performance data leave
much to be desired, the demographic information gathered
by many programs indicates that the Medically Needy
Account is making new health care services available to the
working poor and other in-between populations. For example,
the Premium Sharing Program has eligibility requirements
that make service available to persons at or below 200 percent
of the federal poverty level. In addition, some of the demo-
graphic information indicates that services are increasing to
the groups specifically targeted by the initiative: namely the
medically needy, medically indigent and low-income chil-
dren. Since 1995, Medically Needy Account funds have
provided at least 150,000 medical services in Arizona.
 Although the effectiveness of Arizona’s
“smelly, puking habit” smoking cessation 
program has not yet been quantified, similar
anti-tobacco efforts have worked well elsewhere.
While Arizona’s “smelly, puking habit” tobacco cessation
campaign has proven popular with the public, evaluations
have been mixed. A September 1999 report by the Arizona
Auditor General was critical of the campaign’s failure to
conduct a baseline survey of youth smoking before initiating
the campaign. Despite the quantification difficulties in 
Arizona, both California and Massachusetts have seen sub-
stantial decreases in their tobacco consumption following
the imposition of similar cessation campaigns. Based on
these two states, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
has concluded that the combination of tobacco cessation
and an increase in tobacco tax is the most effective way to
reduce tobacco consumption. Because of the passage of
Proposition 200 in 1994, both factors are now in place 
in Arizona.
WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED FROM
PROPOSITION 200 FOR SPENDING ARIZONA’S
SHARE OF THE MULTI-STATE SETTLEMENT?
 First, decide on a desired impact or impacts.
As with the Proposition 200 revenues, the nearly $3 billion
in settlement monies scheduled to come to Arizona over the
next 25 years represent an enormous opportunity for the
state. Considering how special interest politics and a lack of
policy resulted in a scattering of programs and expenditures
from Proposition 200, the question of how to spend the set-
tlement perhaps becomes a rather simple one: Would the
state be better served spending the settlement money via the
Prop. 200 “shotgun blast” model, or a simpler approach?
Based on the Proposition 200 experience, the state would be
well served to consider the large sum of money to be an
opportunity to do something significant – perhaps one, two,
or several things – not thirty things. Should the state decide
that the monies or a large portion of the funds are best spent
on health care, a comprehensive state needs assessment
should be performed before allocation of the money begins.  
 Keep it simple and implement it well.
The implementation of Proposition 200 has resulted in a
complex web of fragmented programs and expenditures.
With potentially three billion dollars at stake over 25 years,
Arizona would be wise to make sure that someone is mind-
ing the tobacco settlement store, and properly looking after
it. If the state looks upon the settlement as a unique oppor-
tunity to do one or two significant things, it will go a long
ii
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way toward both making a large impact and simplifying
implementation. The trust fund, endowment, or foundation
concept being used in other states might work well to further
simplify things in Arizona. By adopting this type of structure,
disbursal of the monies can be centralized and easily
tracked, and program implementation and an overarching
purpose for data collection can be housed in one location,
instead of several, or even dozens. In addition, this type of
structure can take responsibility for looking after the “big
picture” of the tobacco settlement in Arizona.
When the tough job of how to spend and implement the
settlement is decided, however, the work is only beginning.
Arizona cannot afford to do a half-hearted job of implement-
ing the settlement funds, as occurred with the Proposition 200
funds. The state would be well served to decide today that 25
years from now, Arizona should be held up as the model for
the impact the tobacco settlement had on a state. Such a
commitment will ensure not only that the money is well
invested, but that it will have an impact.
 Be smart about data collection and evaluation.
Whatever the state decides to do with the settlement fund
opportunity, data collection and evaluation should be
included prominently. It is critical that the Legislature
regards performance measurement as an integral part of 
any spending plan. 
So, what is “smart” data collection and evaluation? To 
be most effective, data gathering and evaluation must be
addressed during program design by all stakeholders: 
legislators, program operations persons, and anyone else
interested in outcomes. Above all, the data should measure
results, not just processes, and the data should focus on what
the project or projects are accomplishing, especially in terms
of impact on people. The primary focus should be to not
only know what programs are doing, but to know whether
they are doing any good. But make no mistake: good evalu-
ation takes time. It is difficult to tell in just one or two years
whether a program is effective or not.  
Finally, “smart” evaluation involves private – or at least
independent – evaluation. It is best not to assign government
agencies to evaluate the programs they administer, as has
occurred with several of the Proposition 200-funded programs.
 Watch implementation closely.
One final lesson learned from the Proposition 200 
experience is that regardless of the ground rules set out for
implementation or how carefully the language of a ballot
initiative is written, politics will almost certainly find a way
into the process. According to interviews for this project, the
supporters of Proposition 200 believed that they had drafted
an initiative that was essentially “self-enacting” with lan-
guage that would avoid the Legislature, and therefore, avoid
politics. Ultimately, they were proven wrong.
Thus, perhaps a key lesson for Arizona voters, consumer
and public law advocates, and the media is to keep a close
eye on how any law or initiative passed in Arizona is imple-
mented over time by the Legislature. Keeping watch over
how the money is spent and implemented will not only
ensure that the will of the people is validated, but will 
probably also increase the impact of the funds and increase
the public’s trust in their elected officials.
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1994 ARIZONA 
PROPOSITION 200
INTENT
• Provide health care services to persons who are medically
needy, medically indigent, and low-income children.
• Encourage people to stop smoking or not start smoking and
educate Arizona residents about the dangers of smoking.
• Provide funding for research of tobacco-related diseases.
• Raise new revenue for the above causes without impacting 
the Department of Corrections’ share of existing tobacco 
tax revenues.
IMPLEMENTATION
• 70% of the new tax revenues dedicated to the “Medically
Needy/Medically Indigent Account.”
• 23% to “Health Education Account.”
• 5% to “Health Research Account.”
• <2% to Department of Corrections’ “Adjustment Account.”
• Funds shall not be subject to legislative “appropriation.” 
• Funds may only supplement, not “supplant” current levels 
of state health care spending.
1998 MULTI-STATE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
INTENT
According to the suit filed by the Arizona Attorney General:
• Recover dollars lost from the state’s general fund due to
increased health care costs brought about by tobacco-related
illness and increased health care insurance premiums paid by
the state for state employees.
• Fund a public education campaign related to smoking 
and health.
• Fund smoking cessation programs in the State of Arizona.
IMPLEMENTATION
• “State Specific Finality” (state court approval with no pending
appeals) is required before funds begin to flow to the state.
• No action required by the state legislature in order to 
take effect.
• No restrictions on spending. States may use the funds for 
any purpose.
SUMMARY OVERVIEW OF ARIZONA’S PROPOSITION 200 
AND THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
2 The final two-percent was dedicated to an “adjustment account” in the Department of Corrections that was receiving a portion of the existing tobacco tax. It was
thought that an increase in tobacco taxes would lower the revenues received by the existing account, and thus, this final two-percent was dedicated to maintain the
Department of Corrections’ account.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND                    When the Smoke Clears
In November 1994, Arizona voters approved Proposition200, the Tobacco Tax and Health Care Act, raising the tax
on all tobacco products in the state, including a 40-cent per
pack increase on cigarettes. According to the proposition, 98
percent of the revenue generated by the tax increase would
be dedicated to three purposes: 1) health care for the med-
ically needy and indigent, 2) programs for the prevention
and reduction of tobacco use, and 3) research on the pre-
vention and treatment of tobacco-related diseases.2 Between
1995 and 1999, the new tobacco tax raised roughly $520
million, and the Arizona Legislature created more than 30
programs and line-item expenditures for these three pur-
poses, the majority related to health care for the medically
needy and indigent.
In November 1998, four years to the month after Arizona
passed Proposition 200, a four-year legal battle between the
tobacco industry and the Attorneys General from 46 states
ended when representatives of both sides signed a historic
settlement agreement. The five largest U.S. tobacco compa-
nies agreed to pay out a total of roughly $206 billion over 25
years in exchange for a promise from the states not to pur-
sue future lawsuits against the tobacco companies to recover
state costs of providing health care for ailing smokers.  
Based on a disbursement formula developed for the settle-
ment, Arizona’s portion of the settlement agreement is
estimated to be roughly $3 billion, paid out over two and a
half decades. In contrast to the voter-approved Proposition
200, the multi-state tobacco agreement is silent on how
individual states can spend their settlement dollars. States
face no restrictions on how the money can be spent.
Following the November 1998 announcement of the multi-
state settlement agreement, political interests and leaders in
Arizona began to step forward with their ideas for how 
Arizona should spend its share of the settlement. Some pro-
posals, citing the Attorneys General reasons for bringing their
lawsuits, called for the money to be dedicated to either
health-related or smoking-prevention expenditures. According
to their logic, the lawsuits were brought to recoup health care
costs, and thus the money should be spent on health care.  
Others, however, began talking about “returning the
money to the state’s taxpayers” in the form of tax cuts. 
After all, they argued, it was the taxpayers that – at least in
theory – paid the state’s tobacco-related health care bills in
the first place, so they should get their money back. Still oth-
ers viewed the settlement as a windfall for the state to spend
however it wanted on urgently needed items in non-health
areas such as education, transportation, and infrastructure.  
WHY THIS RESEARCH WAS CONDUCTED
As elected officials and special interests continued to bring
forward their diverse ideas for spending the settlement in
Arizona, it was obvious that consensus would be difficult, if
not impossible. Interestingly, among the variety of settlement
proposals, there seemed to be one common thread: virtually
all ignored the state’s existing tobacco tax.
Perhaps it was for good reason. At face value, it seemed the
only things that Arizona’s four-year old state tobacco tax and
the brand new multi-state tobacco settlement had in common
were two politically-volatile issues: tobacco and large sums of
public money. But, there were larger, logical, and potentially
more important questions that nobody seemed to be asking:
Where has the Proposition 200 money gone, and what –
if anything – might be learned from Arizona’s four-year
tobacco tax experience that could inform what the state
should or should not do with its share of the tobacco
settlement?
Though there was only limited history and experience of
tobacco settlement spending (a handful of states had settled
prior to November 1998 and were beginning to receive and
spend their funds), by early 1999, there were four years of
history regarding Arizona’s Proposition 200 tobacco tax
increase and the programs created from it.  
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With an eye toward a potential research project with
implications for health policy, St. Luke’s Charitable Health
Trust and ASU’s Morrison Institute for Public Policy began to
dialogue about issues related to Arizona’s tobacco tax, the
multi-state settlement agreement, and public policy. Among
the questions raised: 
• What kinds of programs has Arizona’s Proposition 200
tobacco tax created? 
• What populations and issues have the programs served? 
• What – if anything – can be said about the programs’
performance or “quality”? 
• Have the funds been spent in a manner consistent with
the voter-approved Proposition 200? and, 
• What can be learned from Arizona’s tobacco tax experi-
ence that might inform the spending of the settlement? 
METHODOLOGY OF THE PROJECT
With these questions as a point of departure, St. Luke’s 
Charitable Health Trust entered into separate contracts in Jan-
uary 1999 with ASU’s Morrison Institute for Public Policy and
Phoenix-based research and consulting firm Cannon & Gill.
Cannon & Gill was responsible for collecting information
related to the programs funded by Proposition 200 revenues,
including financial data, populations served, outputs and/or
outcomes, and any available program evaluation information.
The Morrison Institute assumed responsibility for exploring
and analyzing the larger public policy issues surrounding the
tobacco tax, the tobacco settlement, and the public policy
lessons that might be learned from both.
During the first half of 1999, Cannon & Gill began com-
piling data and Morrison Institute staff conducted a series of
interviews with key legislators and legislative staff, advocates
and interested parties on all sides of the tobacco tax issue,
and other persons knowledgeable about tobacco issues.3 In
late-summer 1999, after completing the interviews, the Mor-
rison Institute received the data and program information
from Cannon & Gill and began reviewing the qualitative
and quantitative data to conceptualize the public policy
analyses, overarching findings, and recommendations. 
An advisory committee was assembled and called upon twice
during the project to provide feedback and guidance. The first
meeting, held at the outset of the project, was to discuss
methodology and the prominent issues likely to be discussed.
The second advisory group meeting was to review the draft
findings and recommendations that appear in this report. In
addition, in the fall of 1999, Morrison Institute staff conducted
some follow-up interviews, primarily to present the prelimi-
nary findings and receive feedback from those who were
unable to attend the second advisory committee meeting.
WHAT THIS REPORT IS…AND WHAT IT IS NOT
This report is about Arizona’s 1994 tobacco tax increase,
the funding and programs that have resulted from it, the
1998 multi-state tobacco settlement, and the public policy
issues they share. The discussion centers upon Arizona’s
Proposition 200 tobacco tax increase, and in fact, the analy-
sis is primarily focused on one specific portion of that tax
increase: the Medically Needy Account, where 70 percent of
all new Proposition 200 revenues have gone since 1994.
The decision to look primarily at the Medically Needy
Account  was made by the partnering organizations involved
in the project because 1) it has received the most revenue
from the new tax, 2) it has been where most of the legislative
activity and controversy have occurred during the first several
years of implementation, and 3) unlike the other accounts
created by Proposition 200, it was established for the purpose
of providing new health care services to persons who are med-
ically needy, medically indigent, and low-income children.
Because of these reasons, it was believed that a close exami-
nation of the Medically Needy Account would yield the most
important, and most relevant, lessons for the tobacco settle-
ment. Evaluation materials and data for the other three
Proposition 200-created accounts – to the extent they exist –
were also collected and examined during this project. 
2
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3 Appendix A contains a list of the persons interviewed for this project. Appendix
B contains the names of persons who were invited to attend the project’s 
advisory committee meetings.
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However, because these accounts are much smaller and have
been the subject of only minimal legislative attention, they
are mentioned primarily in passing, where relevant to the
lessons offered by the Medically Needy Account.
Finally, a couple of words about what the report is not. This
report is not a formal performance evaluation of the Tobacco
Tax and Health Care Act (Proposition 200), nor does it offer
specific recommendations for how the state should spend its
portion of the multi-state tobacco settlement.  
While it does look broadly across the implementation of
Proposition 200, and closely at the Medically Needy Account
and its programs and expenditures, the project was never
intended to be a formal performance evaluation. It was
designed to be an overview and analysis of the public policy
questions and implications of Arizona’s existing tobacco tax
and anticipated tobacco settlement. Also, although the report
lists and discusses what a number of other states have cho-
sen to do with their portion of the settlement, it does not
recommend how Arizona should spend its tobacco settle-
ment monies. Again, the project did not set out to do so. 
It goes without saying that an opportunity for Arizona to
receive as much as $3 billion over two decades with few
restrictions is – justifiably – a public policy issue of the
highest importance. However, we believe that decisions
regarding the use of the settlement are best left to the citi-
zens of Arizona and/or their elected representatives. This
document is intended to provide information so that those
decisions can be made thoughtfully.
4HOW PROPOSITION 200 WAS INTENDED:
THE TOBACCO TAX AND HEALTH CARE ACT OF 1994
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THE HISTORY OF ARIZONA’S TOBACCO TAX AND HEALTH CARE ACT
Q: What brought Proposition 200 (the Tobacco
Tax and Health Care Act) to the Arizona 
ballot in 1994?
A: A shifting political environment in the U.S.
and Arizona combined with a series of events,
including a controversial budget-saving pro-
posal by the then-governor, allowed several
forces to align which ultimately brought
Proposition 200 to the ballot.
Political history tells us that taxation has never been a
generally popular notion in America. However, while taxes,
such as those on income, have consistently proven less-than-
popular among the American populace, taxes on items such
as tobacco and liquor have been more politically palatable,
particularly during the last several decades. These so-called
“sin taxes” (taxes on tobacco, liquor) have frequently passed
at the state and federal level due to three factors: 
1) The argument that those who do not use the product do
not pay the tax;
2) The argument that an increase in the tax will reduce
demand for the product, and thus reduce the societal ills
caused by the “sin;” and, 
3) The coming together of often-diverse coalitions to work
for passage of “sin taxes.”
Tobacco has proven a popular “sin” to tax in the U.S. 
in recent decades for each of the above reasons. In the late
1970s, President Jimmy Carter supported a large federal
excise tax on cigarettes after a coalition formed by the Amer-
ican Cancer Society and the American Medical Association
endorsed the concept. President Clinton also proposed a new
federal excise tax on tobacco products in 1993 to pay for his
health care plan that was ultimately defeated in Congress.
In addition to the federal proposals to tax tobacco, the
period of state government fiscal austerity during the 1980s
and 1990s caused a number of states to impose sin taxes. It
seemed as though demands for government services were
increasing at the same time revenues were either stable or
shrinking. As a result, many state legislatures turned to
tobacco taxes as a less politically painful way to raise revenue.
In 1990, the Arizona Legislature raised the state’s sales tax
on cigarettes to 18 cents per pack as one piece of a large tax
package designed to reduce a projected $250 million budget
shortfall.4 The 1990 legislative tobacco tax increase quickly
started bringing in close to $50 million per year to Arizona’s
general fund.
In addition to state legislatures looking to tobacco taxes
for revenue, some states with the ballot initiative process
6
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In 1988, voters in California passed Proposition 99, increasing taxes on all
tobacco products with a portion of the revenue dedicated to healthcare. Though
not obvious at the time, the Golden State was once again at the forefront of what
would become a significant public policy issue. Just a couple of years later, by the
early 1990s, public sentiment toward tobacco in the U.S. – and in Arizona – was
shifting notably.  
In his 1993 budget, Arizona Governor Fife Symington proposed saving $82 million
by raising the eligibility bar for medically needy and medically indigent persons,
a move that would have dropped thousands from the state’s health safety net. The
suggestion drew an immediate and strong opposition from the hospitals, who
began looking at California’s Proposition 99 and wondering if something similar
might work in Arizona. After a survey of Arizona residents indicated they were
favorable to the idea of raising tobacco taxes to pay for health care for the med-
ically needy, the hospitals began to mobilize. Eventually, a diverse coalition of
political interests came together and gathered enough signatures to place Proposi-
tion 200, the Tobacco Tax and Health Care Act, on the November 1994 ballot. After
a somewhat testy campaign, Proposition 200 passed with a 50.8 percent majority.
4 Foster, Ed “Tax Plans Would Nip Arizonans’ Wallets” The Arizona Republic
2/23/90.
ov
er
vi
ew
began to see proposition efforts to increase tobacco taxes in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1988, through Proposition
99, California voters passed a tobacco tax on themselves,
increasing the tax on all packs of cigarettes sold in the state
from 10 cents to 35 cents with a portion of the new revenues
earmarked for healthcare. Voters in Massachusetts followed
California’s lead by passing a similar tobacco tax increase
ballot initiative in 1992.
In 1993, the political environment in Arizona seemed 
to be ripening to the notion of a ballot initiative to raise
tobacco taxes. In an effort to gain some $82 million in 
budget savings, Governor
Symington publicly pro-
posed dropping roughly
35,000 medically indigent
Arizonans from the state’s
Medicaid substitute pro-
gram, the Arizona Health
Care Cost Containment Sys-
tem (AHCCCS).5 The state’s
hospitals quickly protested
Governor Symington’s idea, saying that they would have to
absorb heavy costs because they would be forced to continue
to treat the uninsured, only now, uncompensated. The hos-
pitals noted that dropping such a large portion of medically
needy persons from the state’s health safety net would only
lead to higher hospital costs that would ultimately be passed
on to the consumer and the private sector through higher
insurance premiums. 
In response to the governor’s plan and what seemed to be
the tip of a growing national tide against the tobacco indus-
try, the Arizona Hospital Association commissioned a poll of
state residents in 1993. The purpose was to gauge sentiment
on the governor’s plan, and also on the idea of an increase
on tobacco taxes to pay for health care for Arizona’s med-
ically indigent and medically needy.6
Seventy-two percent of Arizonans in the poll, conducted
statewide by the Gallup organization, said they opposed bud-
get cuts that might reduce the availability of health services to
medically needy or medically indigent persons. A 60 percent
majority indicated a willingness to pay more taxes to support
health care for people who could not afford it. And finally, 
82 percent of Arizonans said they would support increases in
taxes on tobacco to pay for health care for the poor.
With these clearly favorable poll numbers and a highly
objectionable plan by the Governor, the Arizona Hospital
Association began studying the passage of California’s
Proposition 99. Over the next several months, into late 1993,
the Hospital Association assembled a coalition of more than
20 Arizona health care groups (including the Cancer Society,
the Lung Association, and the Heart Association) and began
to prepare potential initiative language for the November
1994 ballot.  
The outline of the proposed initiative was simple: allow 
Arizona residents to raise tobacco taxes from the existing 
18-cent per pack to 58-cents per pack with the new revenue
dedicated to health care services for the uninsured, youth
smoking cessation programs, and research on tobacco-
related diseases.
Q: What happened during the Proposition 200
campaign in 1994?
A: Allegations and counter-allegations flew
between supporters and opponents about 
the other side’s tactics and motives. 
Ultimately, Proposition 200 passed with 
a razor-thin majority.
On February 1, 1994, signature collectors began circulat-
ing petitions statewide on behalf of “Arizona for a Healthy
Future,” the growing coalition’s chosen moniker. In the
span of just a few months, the coalition had grown from 20
to more than 50 health care-related and educational groups,
and had secured Arizona conservative icon and former U.S.
Senator Barry Goldwater to chair the campaign. Having lost
his wife ten years earlier to a smoking-related illness, Sena-
tor Goldwater agreed to be chair. 
The campaign to pass the so-called “Tobacco Tax and
Health Care Act” was launched. More than 105,000 signa-
tures would have to be gathered by July 7, 1994 in order to
place the proposition on the November 8 ballot. 
With the issues of taxes, tobacco, and large sums of public
money as a backdrop, it did not take long for the campaign
to turn somewhat nasty, with allegations and counter-allega-
tions from both sides throughout the summer of 1994.
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5 Pitzl, Mary Jo. “Governor, Foes Meet On Health: Solutions, Not Debates, Sought
By Symington.” The Arizona Republic. January 9, 1993.
6 Ibid.
In a 1993 Gallup poll,
82% of Arizona 
residents said they
would support increases
in taxes on tobacco to
pay for health care 
for the poor.
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Opponents claimed the initiative was nothing more than
self-enrichment for the hospitals. Arizona State Senate Presi-
dent John Greene told The Arizona Republic, “…they’re
wanting to take $100 million of tax money and put it in
their pockets and say, ‘it’s ours and we can do with it what
we want.’” Others in the Arizona Legislature came out in
opposition because they saw it as “ballot-box budgeting” –
usurping their right as elected members of the Legislature to
appropriate monies.
Several anti-Proposition 200 groups quickly arose and pre-
sented additional arguments against the initiative. Among
the arguments made: the proposition language was too
vague as to how the money would be spent, the tobacco tax
increase would create new entitlement programs that would
be unfunded if the tax revenues declined and, the Depart-
ment of Revenue would have to apply more resources and
scramble to figure out how to collect the tax, which for the
first time, would be collected on Indian reservations. Indian
tribes publicly proclaimed that the proposed initiative would
be an infringement upon their sovereignty. In an effort to
paint the Prop. 200-supporting hospitals as greed-motivated,
opponents publicized documents showing several Arizona
hospitals earning large profits and paying generous salaries
to their administrators while enjoying a tax-exempt status.
For their part, the supporting organizations claimed they
were being “bullied and threatened” by opponents, including
Governor Symington and Senate President Greene. During the
signature collection portion 
of the campaign, the proposi-
tion’s backers charged that an
organized conspiracy between
the insurance and tobacco
industries was working to
block them from getting 
signatures. One of the pro-
Proposition 200 campaign
chairs produced affidavits from petition circulators stating
they had been offered money to give up their petitions, 
allegations that if true, were clearly illegal.
Despite the bickering and allegations, representatives of 
Arizona for a Healthy Future submitted more than 200,000
petition signatures to the Arizona Secretary of State’s office
on Friday, July 2, 1994. The number of signatures was nearly
twice as many as the 105,000 needed, which virtually nulli-
fied any idea by the opposition to challenge the signatures
and have the proposition disqualified.
The campaign then moved toward November. During the
campaign’s final months and weeks, the battle over Proposi-
tion 200 intensified. Both supporters and opponents took
their arguments to the media. An opposition column in The
Arizona Republic again cited the potential “windfall” for
hospitals and discussed the supporters’ “façade” of a grass
roots coalition that was almost entirely financed by several
large hospitals. Proponents responded by criticizing the esti-
mated $4.7 million anti-Prop. 200 “war chest funded by the
tobacco industry,” claiming they had been outspent by more
than two-to-one.7 An early October poll by KAET-TV indi-
cated that margin in favor of Proposition 200 was shrinking
rapidly and stood at just 59 percent; apparently the opposi-
tion money was beginning to have an effect.
On election day, an exit poll of more than 1,000 voters
showed Proposition 200 apparently going down to defeat.
Both men and women, young and middle-aged voters, all
income groups (except the highest income level), and – per-
haps not surprisingly – a strong 88 percent of persons who
said they were smokers all reported they were voting “no”.
Despite this poll, proponents went to bed on Tuesday, Novem-
ber 8 with the election’s outcome still up in the air, with the
initiative passing by just 51 percent to 49 percent. Opponents
were counting on the late-arriving votes from Arizona’s
northern reservation areas to push the “no” side to victory.
And indeed, Proposition 200 failed by a three-to-one mar-
gin in Apache and Navajo counties, but it was not enough to
stop passage of Proposition 200 by the razor-thin statewide
margin of 50.8 percent to 49.2 percent. The margin of vic-
tory was about 18,000 votes out of the 1.1 million votes cast
in the election.
Twenty days after the November election, the Arizona Sec-
retary of State officially canvassed the results of the election
and Governor Symington signed a proclamation mandating
the proposition be placed into law. The new, higher tax rates
on all tobacco products began to be collected throughout the
state roughly one month after the election.
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7 The final official campaign filings made available in mid-December 1994,
showed that the opposition organization actually spent closer to $5.8 million, a
state record for spending in an election. Murphy, Michael, “Tobacco Tax Foes’
Funding Set a Record,” Phoenix Gazette, December 14, 1994.
Proposition 200 passed
in Arizona in 1994 
by a margin of 50.8%
to 49.2%, or about
18,000 votes out of the
1.1 million votes cast.
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On December 19, 1994, The Arizona Republic published a
remarkably prescient editorial:
“Arizona hasn’t seen a Legislature that appreciates
being told how to make laws or how to spend money,
particularly on a measure that it’s not fond of. 
Proposition 200 was not supported by the legislative
leadership or the governor, so while the will of the 
people will not be circumvented, expect considerable
time and money to be spent shaping the initiative into
workable and politically acceptable public policy…
Also expect attempts to raid the healthy revenue pot the
tax will generate, an estimated $90 million the first
year alone.”
Indeed, despite its passage and enactment, the fight over
Proposition 200 was only beginning. Almost immediately,
interests on all sides of the debate began to disagree over what
the language of the proposition specifically mandated and
how it mandated it. Indeed, the debate and dialogue have
continued for most of the past five years, and continue today.
Q: What happened to Proposition 200 after 
Arizona voters passed it in 1994?
A: Some legislators initially sought to make 
significant changes, but the Act was 
eventually codified into law. 
Despite voter approval of Proposition 200, some in the 
Arizona Legislature sought to make changes to the new law
almost immediately – even going so far as to suggest that it
be repealed entirely. Two bills seeking to alter the Act were
introduced early in the 1995 legislative session, roughly two
months after passage. The first would have inhibited the
spending of any new revenue until after an unspecified
“study period.” The second would have swept all of the new
revenue into the State’s general fund, where it could be used
on virtually any expenditure.8
According to local news media, the motivation behind
these moves was clear. In December, an Arizona Republic
editorial indicated that the newspaper would be closely
watching the implementation of Proposition 200 because
some in the Legislature were openly
hostile to the initiative. In January,
the paper followed up with several
articles tracking the legislative
wrangling citing legislators’ argu-
ments for their efforts to change the
approved initiative. Two basic argu-
ments were being made: 1) the
proposition subverted the legislative
process by directing public money
without any legislative oversight,
and 2) the public was misled by a
distorted pro-200 campaign.
Despite the legislative tussle, the original framework of
Proposition 200 was not substantially altered during the
1995 legislative session. One key reason was an appearance
at the State Capitol by Proposition 200 campaign chairman
Barry Goldwater, who forcefully persuaded a House Commit-
tee to uphold the voters’ wishes and reject the idea of
sweeping the revenue into the general fund. Ultimately, near
the end of the 1995 general session, the Tobacco Tax and
Health Care Act was codified through House Bill 2275 as
Laws 1995, Chapter 275.
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FIGURE 1 BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE
TOBACCO TAX AND HEALTH
CARE ACT
(as passed by Arizona voters in November 1994, and enacted
in Laws, 1995, Chapter 275)
Arizona’s 18-cents per pack cigarette tax is increased to 
58-cents (and taxes increase on all other tobacco products).
The new tax revenue is divided as follows:
 70% of the new revenue shall be deposited in the “Med-
ically Needy Account” for health care services for persons
determined medically indigent, medically needy, or low-
income children.
 23% of the new revenue shall be deposited in the “Health
Education Account” for programs for the prevention and
reduction of tobacco use.
 5% of the new revenue shall be deposited in the “Health
Research Account” for research on the prevention and 
treatment of tobacco-related disease and addiction.
 No more than 2% of the new revenue shall be deposited
in the Department of Corrections’ “Corrections Fund,” 
to hold the fund harmless from decreases in revenue it
might suffer from the tax increase causing existing
tobacco tax revenue to decline. 8 Van Der Werf, Martin, “2 Bills Target Tobacco Tax Cash; Seek to Redirect Use of
Revenues,” The Arizona Republic, January 21, 1995.
“Arizona hasn’t
seen a Legislature
that appreciates
being told how to
make laws or spend
money…” 
editorial in The
Arizona Republic,
December 19,1994
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Although the Act was codified into law, the apparent dis-
dain for it by at least a few members of the Legislature did
not immediately go away. One piece of evidence of this dis-
dain is the fact that the Legislative Oversight Committee on
the Tobacco Tax and Health Care Fund, mandated by H.B.
2275, has never met. No meeting of the Oversight Committee
has occurred despite the fact that the implementing law
requires the Department of Health Services to report annu-
ally to this Committee regarding the availability of funds in
the Medically Needy Account.
Q: What did Arizona’s voters think they were
voting for when they passed the Tobacco Tax
and Health Care Act?
A: The proposition language made clear that the
majority of new revenue would be dedicated
to health care services for the state’s medically
needy and indigent.
As noted above, opponents of Proposition 200 sought to
nullify the new law almost immediately after passage
because they believed the voters had been duped by a slick
campaign. However, advertisements aside, the summary of
Proposition 200 that appeared on voters’ ballots distilled the
Act down to a single sentence:9
“A ‘yes’ vote shall have the effect of increasing the state
tax on cigarettes, cigars and other tobacco products to
provide for health care for the medically indigent,
medically needy or low income children, tobacco
related education and research.”
On the six pages of legal language that followed this sum-
mary, the text of the Act spelled out specific provisions,
including the establishment of several new “accounts” to be
created for the revenue, and the proportions of the new rev-
enue to be deposited within the accounts. The text of the 
Act states: 
“The Tobacco Tax and Health Care Fund is established
in the State Treasury… The Fund shall be deposited in
four separate accounts and shall be administered as
set forth below for the following purposes…”
“1. Twenty-three cents of each dollar in the Fund 
shall be deposited in the Health Education Account for
programs for the prevention and reduction of tobacco
use…”
“2. Five cents of each dollar in the Fund shall be
deposited in the Health Research Account for the
research on the prevention and treatment of tobacco-
related disease and addiction…”
“3. Seventy cents of each dollar shall be deposited in
the Medically Needy Account, for providing persons
determined medically indigent…or medically
needy…or low income children…with health care
services…”
“4. Two cents of each dollar in the Fund shall be
deposited in the Adjustment Account for transfer of
appropriate amounts to the Corrections Fund…to
compensate for decreases in the Corrections Fund
resulting from lower tobacco tax revenues…”
To anyone who read the initiative, these provisions made
clear the priorities of Proposition 200 and where its support-
ers wanted the new tax money to go. With its receipt of 70
percent of the funds, the provision of new health care ser-
vices for the medically indigent, medically needy, and
low-income children was obviously the highest priority of
the initiative. The second priority, by virtue of the fact that it
was assigned 23 percent of the new funds, was for spending
on the prevention and reduction of tobacco use. The
remaining relatively small amount of money was dedicated
to research of tobacco-related diseases, and to ensure that a
pot of tobacco tax money received by the Department of 
Corrections from previous legislation would be maintained
should the new higher tax cause a reduction in revenue.
9 A copy of the entire text of Proposition 200, the Tobacco Tax and Health Care
Act, is contained in Appendix C.
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Q: Has the overarching intent or “spirit” of the
Tobacco Tax and Health Care Act been 
followed?
A: The answer is both ‘yes’ and ‘no.’ The four
accounts created by Proposition 200 have
been well maintained in the proportions
spelled out in the initiative. However, large
portions of the initiative’s Medically Needy
Account have not been spent and remain
unspent, thus depriving the medically needy
of services and undermining the intent of 
the initiative.
The four accounts and their designated allotments 
(percentages) of revenue have been well maintained since
1995. Only two relatively minor irregularities have appeared
during the five-year period, and both irregularities were in
fiscal year 1996.  
As Figure 2 illustrates, in FY1996, the Health Research
Account, scheduled to receive 5 percent of funds, ended up
with nearly 7 percent, and the Health Education Account,
mandated by law to receive 23 percent, received only about
21.5 percent. Thus, the overage in the Health Research
Account seemed to be at the expense of the Health 
Education Account. 
The Medically Needy Account appears to have received
more than its allotted 70 percent in each of the other years
examined, and the Department of Corrections Account seems
to be receiving well below the “less-than-two percent” 
mandated annually. Figure 2 summarizes how well the
Proposition 200-mandated percentages have been main-
tained through fiscal year 1999.
Based on the figures on the following page, the overarch-
ing priorities (the four primary “accounts”) created by the
ballot initiative have been maintained at the percentages
approved by the voters in November 1994. The voters
approved an increase in tobacco taxes to primarily finance
health care for Arizona’s medically needy/medically indigent
population, and secondarily for health education and, for
the most part, those accounts are where most of the revenue
has gone.
However, while the money has been deposited into the
accounts in proper proportions, the next chapter discusses
the fact that much of the revenue in the Medically Needy
Account has gone unspent. Thus, while the spirit of Proposi-
tion 200 has been maintained through the accounts, it has
not provided all of the health care it potentially can for the
medically needy and medically indigent because it has not
been spent.
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CHAPTER TWO
Despite several early attempts in the Arizona Legislature to modify the framework
of the voter-approved Tobacco Tax and Health Care Act (Proposition 200), the
overarching intent of the original voter-approved Act has been largely main-
tained. That is, 1994’s Proposition 200 was primarily intended to provide health
care services to the state’s medically indigent and medically needy, and that is
what it has done through the accounts established by the initiative. However, not
all of the funds collected under the 1994 tax increase have been spent, a situation
which constitutes a violation of the spirit of the law. 
It also appears that two specific provisions of Proposition 200 have been violated.
One provision prohibits the Legislature from using the tobacco tax revenue to
“supplant” existing healthcare services offered by the State, and the second provi-
sion states that the new funds not be “subject to appropriation.” It appears that
the Legislature has used Prop. 200 revenues to supplant previous expenditures for
the “Quick Pay Discount Program,” the “$10 Million Hospital Reimbursement”
and bail out of the “Healthcare Group.” In addition, although the Legislature
claims not to “appropriate” the funds, they do acknowledge “allocating” the
funds, a distinction of terms that is very minor indeed.
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Q: Has the “letter” of Proposition 200 been 
followed?10
A: Several “letter of the law” violations have
occurred. Specifically, it appears that 
prohibitions on using the money to 
“supplant” existing services and legislative
“appropriation” have occurred.
Although the spirit of Proposition 200 – to provide funds
for Arizona’s medically needy and medically indigent – has
been marginally maintained during the first five years of
implementation, other more specific “letter of the law” 
provisions in the Act appear to have been violated by the
Legislature. Specifically, provisions restricting “supplanting”
and the “appropriation” of the funds.  
It was primarily in these two provisions that the Proposi-
tion 200 proponents specifically sought to restrict Legislative 
control over the funds. It is also these provisions which –
according to a number of interviews conducted for this
report – caused much of the hostility toward the initiative
from the Legislature.
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Tobacco Tax and
Health Care Fund
Collections $55,517,900 $124,987,200 $116,545,300 $114,448,500 $112,388,400
(not including 100% 100%* 100%* 100% 100%
interest and
balances forward)
Medically Needy
Account $39,174,100 $89,036,200 $82,829,400 $81,503,300 $79,825,300
70% 70.5% 71.2% 71.0% 71.2% 71.0%
Health Education
Account $12,872,700 $27,093,000 $27,215,300 $26,779,600 $26,228,300
23% 23.1% 21.6% 23.3% 23.3% 23.3%
Health Research
Account $2,798,300 $8,404,000 $5,916,300 $5,821,600 $5,701,800
5% 5.0% 6.7% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Department of
Corrections $514,100 $139,700 $280,400 $0** $280,400
<2% 0.9% 0.1% 0.2% 0% 0.2%
Dept. of Revenue
Admin. Costs $158,700 $314,300 $303,900 $344,000 $352,600
(not specified) 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3%
FIGURE 2 ARIZONA TOBACCO TAX REVENUE ALLOCATIONS BY ACCOUNT, FY95-FY99
(BASED ON FIGURES FROM THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMITTEE)
FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999
(partial year)
* The 7% drop in Tobacco Tax collections between FY96 and FY97 is difficult to explain. It may be at least partially due to the increase in the cost of tobacco products,
although there are probably other factors.
** According to JLBC, the Arizona Department of Corrections did not receive any Tobacco Tax funds in FY98 because the criteria established for the transferal of funds 
were not met.
10 Although the following analysis contains discussions of legal issues and prin-
ciples, it is not a legal opinion. None of the issues discussed here has yet been
the subject of litigation in Arizona. 
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Regarding Supplanting
Under the heading “use of funds,” language in Proposi-
tion 200 states:
“…Monies deposited in the Medically Needy Account
shall only be used to supplement funds appropriated
by the Legislature…”11
“…Monies deposited in the Medically Needy Account
shall not be used to supplant funds appropriated by
the Legislature for the purpose of providing levels of
service established pursuant to Title 35, Chapter 29,
Article 1. For the purposes of this section, “levels of 
service” means the provider payment methodology,
eligibility criteria and covered services estab-
lished…(and) in effect on July 1, 1993.”
In the more than 20 interviews conducted for this project, 
a number of people – both those in favor and even some
opposed to Proposition 200 – indicated that the Legislature
had indeed violated the supplanting clause by using new
tobacco tax revenue to fund existing services. In interviews,
several members of the Legislature even acknowledged that
some supplanting had probably gone on with the new
tobacco tax funds. The items commonly mentioned in 
interviews as possible “supplantations” were: 
 “Phase Out of the Quick Payment Discount 
Program.” During the first Special Session of 1997, the
Arizona Legislature passed and the Governor signed the
Omnibus Health Budget Reconciliation bill. Section 6 of
the bill called for a withdrawal in the amount of more
than $26 million from the Medically Needy Account to
pay for five items. The first item on the list was a $7.9
million expenditure “to continue the scheduled phase-out
of the quick payment discount required by Laws 1993…”
 “$10 Million Hospital Reimbursement.” Another
of the five items listed in a $26 million withdrawal from
the Medically Needy Account authorized during the 
Second Special Session of 1997 was “$10,000,000 to 
discontinue the annual ten million dollar discount on
private hospital reimbursement required by Laws
1993…” This expenditure apparently was initially 
created in 1993 as a reimbursement fund for hospitals to
recover the costs related to serving medically needy and
medically indigent patients.
 “Healthcare Group.” Initiated January 1, 1988 and
expanded statewide in March 1993, Healthcare Group
allows small Arizona employers (less than 50 employees)
to purchase health insurance for their employees through
AHCCCS. In 1999, the Arizona Legislature modified some
of the program’s eligibility criteria and transferred $8
million in tobacco tax funds out of the Medical Services
Stabilization Fund within the Medically Needy Account to
assist the financially struggling Healthcare Group.
Other interviewees expressed the view that in addition to
these apparently direct violations, there are several expendi-
tures that seem to violate the “spirit” of the supplanting
clause because they cause the Tobacco Tax and Health Care
Fund to absorb an expenditure that – in the absence of the
tobacco tax revenue – would have most likely been the
responsibility of the state’s General Fund. Most commonly
mentioned among this group were:
 “Offset Loss in Federal Funding.” The 1997
Omnibus Health Budget also included an expenditure 
of $4.1 million from the Medically Needy Account to
“replace federal funds reduced due to the lower federal
matching assistance percentage…” A question remains,
however, whether the supplanting language in Proposi-
tion 200 was intended to prohibit the supplanting of only
state expenditures, or both state and federal expenditures.
 “Medical Inflation.” During the 1999 legislative 
session, the Joint Legislative Budget Committee’s recom-
mendation for the AHCCCS budget called for increased
funding for projected inflation of 3.5 percent in
capitation rates for FY00 and FY01. JLBC formally 
recommended that the cost of this inflation be shared 
50 percent by the state’s General Fund and 50 percent by
the Medically Needy Account of the Tobacco Tax and
Health Care Fund because inflation “represents a new
cost” and thus, is not supplanting. This proposal was 
discussed and adopted in the Health and Welfare Sub-
committee hearing on the AHCCCS budget in early 1999.
The Arizona Hospital and Healthcare Association argued
that this spending for inflation was supplanting because
in all prior years, 100 percent of the cost of inflation had
been paid out of the Arizona General Fund.
13
11 Although this quote only mentions the Medically Needy Account, similar lan-
guage appearing earlier in the Act also prohibits supplanting through use of
any from any of the other accounts.
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It should also be mentioned that at least two other pro-
grams or expenditures funded by Proposition 200 revenues
probably would not have occurred in Arizona had the
tobacco tax increase of 1994 not passed. Arizona’s KidsCare
health plan uses a large chunk of tobacco tax dollars for the
mandated federal match, and the 48-hour maternity length
of stay passed by Congress and signed by President Clinton
in 1997 would have been an unfunded federal mandate had
the Proposition 200 dollars not been available.
Regarding Appropriations
In addition to the language regarding “supplanting” 
contained in Proposition 200, there were several paragraphs
in the Act that discussed the Legislature’s prohibition of
“appropriating” the new tobacco tax funds. The provisions
appeared twice in the initiative:
“The fund and its accounts are not subject to appro-
priation. Expenditures from each account are not
subject to additional approval, notwithstanding any
statutory provision to the contrary.”
“It is the intention and desire of the people of Arizona
in enacting this measure by initiative that the funds
provided hereby are in addition to and separate from
other funds that are now and shall be annually
appropriated by the legislature. The funds provided
hereby shall not be deemed or classed to be appropria-
tions by the legislature.”
During the campaign and just after passage, this language
was at the center of controversy, as many opponents read the
provisions to say that the Legislature was not to have any
authority whatsoever over what the new incoming tax rev-
enue could be spent on. In reality, however, this has not been
the case. The Health Committees in the Arizona Legislature
have had authority over the funds and have chosen where
and when to spend – or not to spend – the Proposition 200
tobacco tax revenues.
However, the central issue regarding this language
remains: Was this prohibition on “legislative appropria-
tions” intended to make Proposition 200 essentially
self-enacting so that the tax revenue would flow directly
from the Arizona Department of Revenue to each of the four
accounts, completely bypassing the Legislature?  
Although some supporters of the initiative maintained in
interviews that this was never the intent, others have said
that the language was designed to keep the Legislature from
spending the new revenue by having it bypass them com-
pletely and going directly to agency directors who would
“administer” the accounts.
Despite the possible intent of the appropriations language
and the reality of what has actually occurred, there is a
practical problem with the aforementioned mechanism that
is probably at the root of
why it has never occurred.
The problem is this: What
would happen if the Direc-
tor of AHCCCS (the agency
that is supposed to “admin-
ister” the Medically Needy
Account, according to
Proposition 200) began 
to spend the funds being
deposited into the Medically
Needy Account in any man-
ner that he or she saw fit, without consulting the Governor
or the Legislature? Obviously, because the AHCCCS Director
is appointed by, and serves at the pleasure of the Governor,
this type of action would probably result in his or her imme-
diate dismissal.
So, how has the new tobacco tax money been spent 
without violating the specific “not subject to appropriation”
clause? According to JLBC reports, the Legislature’s expendi-
tures of the Tobacco Tax and Health Care Fund are officially
“allocations,” not “appropriations.” Several persons 
interviewed for this project indicated that abandoning the
“appropriations” language contained in Proposition 200
was a necessary and politically expedient solution to a prob-
lem with no good solution. They argued that if the language
was read literally and acted upon, it might – as indicated
above – either result in a political standoff, or the firing of
an agency head. Neither of these events has ever occurred
because the Legislature’s House and Senate Health Commit-
tees simply began to “allocate” the funds almost
immediately after Proposition 200 passed.
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How have the Prop. 200
funds been spent by the
Legislature without 
being “appropriated”?
Technically, the 
expenditures have 
been “allocations,” 
not “appropriations.”
TRACKING PROPOSITION 200’S IMPLEMENTATION, FUNDING FLOWS,
AND PROGRAMS
Q: How has implementation of the Medically
Needy Account gone?
A: Politics and a lack of overarching state health
policy goals have left large unspent balances
in the Medically Needy Account and created 
a “shotgun blast” of programs to address a
variety of perceived gaps.
During the 1994 campaign, Arizona’s Governor and sev-
eral other state political leaders expressed open opposition 
to Proposition 200. After the initiative passed, much of the
opposition turned to indignation and obstruction. Ulti-
mately, however, after an attempt to sweep the funds into 
the general fund failed in early 1995, the Tobacco Tax and
Health Care Act was codified in Laws 1995.
Substantial amounts of revenue immediately began to
flow into the four accounts. More than $55 million was
deposited in the overarching Tobacco Tax and Health Care
Fund during fiscal year 1995 (the new tax was collected for
only about half of the fiscal year), and more than $100 mil-
lion in Proposition 200 tobacco tax revenue poured in
during fiscal year 1996. Because 70 percent of these funds
were being deposited in the Medically Needy Account, it was
growing quite large, with nearly $40 million deposited in 
fiscal 1995, and roughly $89 million deposited in 1996.
Responsibility for allocating these funds fell to the Legisla-
ture’s Health Committees, who had oversight over AHCCCS
and the Arizona Department of Health Services – the agen-
cies designated in Proposition 200 to administer two of the
accounts created. The spending of the tobacco tax revenues
did not come quickly, however, especially those within the
Medically Needy Account.
In early 1995, as the revenue began to flow into the 
Proposition 200 accounts, it appeared that a small group of
legislators was going to try to block most of the new propos-
als for spending. The reason given by some for their
opposition was the fear that new programs created in the
Medically Needy Account would become “entitlements” that
might eventually become the burden of the State’s general
fund – if the tax did as intended and caused less smoking
over time, thus generating less tax revenue. More than one
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CHAPTER THREE
For most Arizona State Legislators, the revenue and programs contained in 
Proposition 200’s largest account (the 70 percent Medically Needy Account) have
been neither high visibility nor high priority issues. Some lawmakers have been
openly contemptuous; others have ignored it because they opposed the original
initiative and fear that new “entitlements” might be created that will eventually
have to be bailed out by the general fund. Still other legislators have been
excluded from the dialogue over how to spend the Prop. 200 funds because of 
the funds’ “off-budget” nature (that is, they are not a part of the normal general
fund budget negotiations).
Because of these factors, spending in the Medically Needy Account began very
slowly. It did not take long, however, for politics and special interests to begin 
the program creation process in earnest, with much activity occurring in 1997
and 1998. Although a great deal of spending in the Medically Needy Account has
occurred recently, the lack of a state health needs assessment and the absence of
overarching health policy goals has caused the funds to scatter to dozens of
diverse expenditures.  
Further, despite the significant program creation activity in recent years, large
unspent carry-over balances are still being seen annually in the Medically Needy
Account. As of the end of 1999, JLBC was projecting large balances – as much as
$90 million annually – to continue through fiscal year 2005.
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person interviewed for this project speculated, however, that
it was a goal of this faction to intentionally create large
unspent balances in the accounts in order to demonstrate 
to Arizona taxpayers that the tax really was not necessary
because the revenues were not being spent.  
Another group of legislators began to make an honest
attempt at implementing what the voters had passed. In 
the middle of this tug-of-war was the Arizona Governor, who
opposed Proposition 200 during the campaign, but after 
passage became interested in using at least a portion of the
money to create a “rainy day fund” for the state’s health-
related expenses. Missing from this legislative dialogue over
policy direction for the tobacco tax revenues, however, were
two important items: information regarding the needs of 
Arizona’s medically needy and medically indigent (including
an accurate calculation of the numbers in this group) and an
overarching state policy regarding health and health care. 
Thus, it was in a highly politicized environment and in the
absence of any statewide assessment information that the
Health Committees began to scatter new programs to address
perceived healthcare needs. Although the needs addressed by
these new programs can correctly be called “perceived” needs
– because no formal assessment had been performed – some
of the new programs have undoubtedly filled actual needs.
New and substantial expenditures were carved out of the
Medically Needy Account for Primary Care Programs 
($5 million per year), Qualifying Community Health Centers
($5 million per year), and Non-Title XIX Mental Health Pro-
grams ($5 million per year). In addition, the Governor’s
concept of a health rainy day or “stabilization fund” was
established within the Medically Needy Account at $15 mil-
lion annually. Also in 1995, two small pilot programs – one
for detoxification services and the other for telemedicine –
were created. In addition, an authorization for “an amount
necessary” was established in the Medically Needy Account
for organ transplants for indigents.
In 1996, new programs were created to help patients with
end-stage renal disease and to provide medical services to
children, among others. The 1997 legislative session saw the
creation of a modest $1 million “health crisis” fund, fund-
ing for a program at the Department of Economic Security
for low-income elderly persons, and a program to help pri-
mary care doctors in rural areas pay back their educational
loans, among others. In 1998, the Legislature used tobacco
tax monies as a match for a federal children’s health insur-
ance program (CHIP, called KidsCare in Arizona), and to
provide $8 million to a state-sponsored small-business
health insurance plan. Between the 1995 and 1999 legisla-
tive sessions, more than 30 line items were created in the
Medically Needy Account for services ranging from organ
transplants, to renal disease management, to HIV/AIDS
drugs, to psychotropic medications for mentally ill persons. 
As one person interviewed for this project said, a “shotgun
blast” of programs has been created with the tobacco tax
revenues in the Medically Needy Account. Figures 3 and 4
depict the so-called “shotgun blast” of programs.
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Total Funds Available: $39,174.1
Total Expenditures: $1,003
1 Organ Transplants 2.6% $ 1,003.0
2 Unspent 97.4% $ 38,171.1
Expenditures in 000’s Source: JLBC
FIGURE 3
TOBACCO TAX 
MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT – FY 1995
1
2
UNSPENT
97.4%
$38,171.1
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1 Nonrenal Disease 
Management <0.25% $ 9.3
2 CHIP Direct Services <0.25% $ 31.7
3 Rural PCP Loan Repay
Program <0.25% $ 37.5
4 Telemedicine <0.25% $ 126.3
5 Renal Disease Management <0.25% $ 239.1
6 Evaluations <0.25% $ 298.4
7 DES Aging and Adult
Administration <0.50% $ 500.0
8 Detoxification Services <0.50% $ 513.6
9 DHS Health Crisis Fund <1.00% $ 862.8
10 HIV/AIDS Treatment <1.00% $ 1,025.8
11 Primary Care Capital
Construction <1.00% $ 1,356.2
12 HIV/AIDS Drug Assistance
Program (ADAP) 1.00% $ 1,698.1
FIGURE 4  TOBACCO TAX MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT – FY 1999
1
3
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13 Basic Children’s Medical
Services 1.30% $ 2,294.3
14 Organ Transplants 2.00% $ 3,500.0
15 Offset Loss in Federal
Funding 2.40% $ 4,096.5
16 Maternity Length of Stay 2.50% $ 4,213.3
17 Qualifying Community 
Health Centers 2.90% $ 4,998.6
18 Mental Health Programs 3.00% $ 5,096.8
19 Primary Care Programs 3.30% $ 5,619.7
20 Phase-Down of Quick Pay 3.70% $ 6,300.6
21 CHIP-KidsCare 5.40% $ 9,251.1
22 $10 M Hospital
Reimbursement 5.80% $ 10,000.0
23 Premium Sharing Project 11.80% $ 20,400.0
24 Unspent 51.90% $ 89,210.6
Expenditures in 000’s Source: JLBC
Total Funds Available: $171,680.3  • Total Expenditures: $82,469.7
UNSPENT
51.9%
$89,210.6
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The Medically Needy Account funds and programs have
been scattered in many directions. Perhaps the more 
important issue, however, is whether the Prop. 200-created
programs are helping the people they are targeting. Almost
certainly, the variety of services in the programs created have
provided medical care to persons and places which would
not have received them had Proposition 200 not been passed
in 1994 (including KidsCare). But, the larger question of
how “effectively” they have done this is more difficult to
answer. That question is the primary focus of Chapter Three.
Q: Has all of the Proposition 200 tobacco tax 
revenue been spent every year?
A: No, spending started slowly and large account
balances began to appear annually. Today,
large unspent balances – as much as $90 
million annually – are still projected far into
the future.
Despite the creation of several large programs in 1995 and
the creation of more in 1996 and 1997, only a small propor-
tion of the money being deposited in the Medically Needy
Account was actually being spent. In the first year that 
revenue began to flow (FY1995) only 3 percent of the $38
million deposited in the Account was spent. Considering that
it takes time to create programs and get them up and run-
ning, this is perhaps understandable. But large carry forward
balances have been maintained annually in the Medically
Needy Account since FY1995. In FY1996, despite the creation
of a new $20 million annual expenditure in the Account,
more than $100 million went unspent.  
As the years have progressed, more programs and line-
item expenditures have been created, and more funds have
been allocated. Despite this progression, substantial carry-
over balances have also remained. Figure 5 presents the
revenue flow into the Medically Needy Account between fiscal
years 1995 and 2000, including funds unallocated (bottom
line). In FY1997, more than 50 percent of the total funds
available in the Medically Needy Account went unspent 
($89 million out of $189 million). In FY1998, another $87.5
million went unspent. By fiscal year 1999, some 24 line item
expenditures and programs had been created in the Med-
ically Needy Account, but still greater than 40 percent of 
the Account was going unallocated ($89 million).  
Figures from JLBC (presented in Figure 5) project large
unallocated balances through FY2005. These figures contrast
with JLBC projections released in early 1999 which showed
negative balances in the Medically Needy Account by 2005
because of significant growth in the KidsCare program and
reductions in revenue due to lower demand for tobacco
products. The revised estimates reveal lower KidsCare expen-
ditures because of a lack of expected enrollment and a
significantly lower decline in tobacco tax revenues, thus
ensuring large balances well into the future.12
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12 JLBC revised figures near the end of 1999 because of slow enrollment in the
federally assisted, low-income health care insurance program, Child Health
Insurance Program (CHIP).
In FY 1996, despite 
the creation of a new 
$20 million annual
expenditure in the
Medically Needy 
Account, more than 
$100 million went
unspent.
FIGURE 5
DETAIL OF PROGRAM AND LINE-ITEM EXPENDITURES AND REVENUE FLOW14
MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT, FY 1995-2005
(actuals through FY 1999, estimates thereafter)13
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FUNDS AVAILABLE
Balance Forward $39,369,600 $101,271,100
Transfer in from Tobacco Tax and Health Care Fund $39,174,100 89,036,200 82,829,400
Interest and Revertments 4,974,400
Total Funds Available $39,174,100 $128,405,800 $189,074,900
ALLOCATION
AHCCCS Medically Needy Allocations:
Offset Loss in Federal Funding $ 2,021,200
Phase-Down of Quick Pay Discount 4,522,800
$10 M Hospital Reimbursement 10,000,000
Maternity Length of Stay
HIV/AIDS Treatment
Medical Inflation
Organ Transplants $1,003,000 $    734,800 $ 1,707,900
Medical Stabilization Fund 14,065,400 45,000,000
Premium Sharing Fund 20,075,000
CHIP (KidsCare)
DHS Health Crisis Fund
DES Aging and Adult Administration
DHS Medically Needy Allocations:
Primary Care Programs $ 3,600,000 $ 4,134,700
Qualifying Community Health Centers 3,600,000 4,404,100
Telemedicine 255,000 255,000
Mental Health Non-Title XIX 3,489,800 5,000,000
Detoxification Services 500,000 500,000
Renal Disease Management 150,000
Basic Children’s Medical Services 1,429,600
Evaluations 282,000
Total Funds Allocated $1,003,000 $26,245,000 $99,482,300
TOTAL FUNDS UNALLOCATED $38,171,100 $102,160,800 $89,592,600
FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997
(partial year)
13 These figures from the Joint Legislative Budget Committee, annual appropriation reports (published) and other JLBC projections.
14 These figures from the Joint Legislative Budget Committee, annual appropriation reports (published) and other JLBC projections (provided to Morrison Institute for
Public Policy). These figures were updated by JLBC in November 1999 to reflect modifications to future year projections.
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FUNDS AVAILABLE
Balance Forward $89,592,600 $87,552,800 $89,210,600 $83,989,100
Transfer in from Tobacco Tax and 
Health Care Fund 81,503,300 80,526,900 79,117,700 77,924,100
Interest and Revertments 4,648,000 3,600,600 3,926,300 4,047,800
Total Funds Available $175,743,900 $171,680,300 $172,254,600 $165,961,000
ALLOCATION
AHCCCS Medically Needy Allocations:
Offset Loss in Federal Funding $ 4,145,000 $ 4,096,500 $ 4,542,200 $ 4,542,200
Phase-Down of Quick Pay Discount 7,978,800 6,300,600 6,794,600 8,206,700
$10 M Hospital Reimbursement 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000
Maternity Length of Stay 1,919,000 4,213,300 2,485,800 2,572,800
HIV/AIDS Treatment 1,223,900 1,025,800 1,229,900 1,349,600
Medical Inflation — — 5,276,000 5,276,000
Organ Transplants 1,619,200 3,500,000 3,590,000 3,590,000
Medical Stabilization Fund 15,000,000 — — —
Premium Sharing Fund 20,325,000 20,400,000 400,000 —
CHIP (KidsCare) — 9,251,100 15,172,000 11,805,900
DHS Health Crisis Fund 1,000,000 862,800 21,000 —
DES Aging and Adult Administration 500,000 500,000 500,000 500,000
DHS Medically Needy Allocations:
Primary Care Programs $5,983,200 $5,619,700 $6,240,000 $6,240,000
Qualifying Community Health Centers 6,874,900 4,998,600 5,200,000 5,200,000
Community Health Centers — — 4,000,000 4,000,000
Telemedicine 368,300 126,300 260,000 —
Mental Health Programs for Non-Title 19 5,000,000 5,096,800 5,200,000 5,200,000
Detoxification Services 500,000 513,600 520,000 —
Renal Disease Management 250,000 239,100 260,000 260,000
Basic Children’s Medical Services Program 4,086,300 2,294,300 — —
Evaluations 242,600 298,400 854,200 854,200
Public Health Education 957,600 — 2,777,800 2,341,500
Rural Primary Care Provider
Loan Repay Program 16,100 37,500 139,000 111,200
Primary Care Capital Construction 136,200 1,356,200 2,500,000 —
Salome Health Services 65,000 — — —
HIV/AIDS Drug Assistance Prog (ADAP) — 1,698,100 1,000,000 1,000,000
Nonrenal Disease Management — 9,300 208,000 208,000
CHIP Direct Services — 31,700 1,000,000 1,000,000
Ajo Health Services — — 95,000 —
Psychotropic Medications for 
SMI Non-Title XIX — — 3,000,000 3,000,000
Psychotropic Medications – 
One-Time Allocation — — 5,000,000 —
Total Funds Allocated $88,191,100 $82,469,700 $88,265,500 $77,258,100
TOTAL FUNDS UNALLOCATED $87,552,800 $89,210,600 $83,989,100 $88,702,900
FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001
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FUNDS AVAILABLE
Balance Forward $88,702,900 $92,620,739 $94,583,549 $95,399,700
Transfer in from Tobacco Tax and 
Health Care Fund 76,755,239 75,603,910 74,469,851 73,352,804
Interest and Revertments 4,422,500 4,205,600 4,226,300 4,218,800
Total Funds Available $169,880,639 $172,430,249 $173,279,700 $172,971,304
ALLOCATION
AHCCCS Medically Needy Allocations:
Offset Loss in Federal Funding $ 4,542,200 $ 4,542,200 $ 4,542,200 $ 4,542,200
Phase-Down of Quick Pay Discount 8,206,700 8,206,700 8,206,700 8,206,700
$10 M Hospital Reimbursement 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000
Maternity Length of Stay 2,572,800 2,572,800 2,572,800 2,572,800
HIV/AIDS Treatment 1,349,600 1,349,600 1,349,600 1,349,600
Medical Inflation 5,276,000 5,276,000 5,276,000 5,276,000
Organ Transplants 3,590,000 3,590,000 3,590,000 3,590,000
Medical Stabilization Fund — — — —
Premium Sharing Fund — — — —
CHIP (KidsCare) 13,396,200 14,066,000 14,769,300 15,507,800
DHS Health Crisis Fund — — — —
DES Aging and Adult Administration 500,000 500,000 500,000 500,000
DHS Medically Needy Allocations:
Primary Care Programs $6,240,000 $6,240,000 $6,240,000 $6,240,000
Qualifying Community Health Centers 5,200,000 5,200,000 5,200,000 5,200,000
Community Health Centers 4,000,000 4,000,000 4,000,000 4,000,000
Telemedicine — — — —
Mental Health Programs for Non-Title 19 5,200,000 5,200,000 5,200,000 5,200,000
Detoxification Services — — — —
Renal Disease Management 260,000 260,000 260,000 260,000
Basic Children’s Medical Services Program — — — —
Evaluations 854,200 854,200 854,200 854,200
Public Health Education 753,000 670,000 — —
Rural Primary Care Provider
Loan Repay Program 111,200 111,200 111,200 111,200
Primary Care Capital Construction — — — —
Salome Health Services — — — —
HIV/AIDS Drug Assistance Prog (ADAP) 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Nonrenal Disease Management 208,000 208,000 208,000 208,000
CHIP Direct Services 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Ajo Health Services — — — —
Psychotropic Medications for 
SMI Non-Title XIX 3,000,000 3,000,000 3,000,000 3,000,000
Psychotropic Medications – 
One-Time Allocation — — — —
Total Funds Allocated $77,259,900 $77,846,700 $77,880,000 $78,618,500
TOTAL FUNDS UNALLOCATED $92,620,739 $94,583,549 $95,399,700 $94,352,803
FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005
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Q: Is it possible that the money has not been
spent because of a lack of demand and/or
need?
A: Although slow-starting, there are some 
indications that enrollment for several 
programs is increasing as information and
marketing about the programs spread. 
Further, based on numerous studies, the
unserviced medically needy/medically 
indigent population in Arizona is substantial.
As noted previously, a number of factors have contributed
to the fact that large portions of the Medically Needy/Med-
ically Indigent money have not been spent. Prominent
among these factors have been the slow creation of pro-
grams because of both initial political opposition and a lack
of needs data, and inadequate outreach and marketing of
several large programs. 
When the Premium Sharing program was created out of
the Medically Needy Account in 1997, a cap on total enroll-
ment was established at 6,000 people. The cap was
established because lawmakers and the program’s adminis-
trators were simply unsure what demand for the program
might be and they did not want to exceed the program’s
budget capacity. Just over a year into the program, however
(in May 1999), enrollment stood at 4,046, well below the
cap. Similarly, the KidsCare (SCHIP) program, designed to
provide a health care safety net for as many as 60,000 of 
Arizona’s children, has not seen the enrollment growth that
was expected when the program was created.  
According to the interviews conducted for this project, the
explanation for these low enrollments is inadequate out-
reach and marketing of the programs. In 1999, outreach
increased significantly for both the KidsCare and Premium
Sharing programs, and, according to both programs, enroll-
ment is expected to grow in the coming years.
The larger question of whether there exists substantial and
unmet health care needs in Arizona among the state’s med-
ically needy and medically indigent population is difficult to
precisely quantify. However, annual data from reports such
as the Anne E. Casey Foundation Kids Count data book and
other sources indicate that Arizona has significant needs.
Some national studies indicate that as many as 280,000 
Arizona children are without health insurance – roughly
one out of every six. The 1999 Kids Count placed Arizona
49th out of the 50 states in the percentage of babies born 
to mothers who receive late or no prenatal care. In 1997,
roughly 74 percent of Arizona’s 2-year olds were immunized,
below the overall U.S. estimate of 78 percent. Further, three
years of data collection in Maricopa County indicate that
roughly 14 percent of the population in the state’s largest
metropolitan county are uninsured.15
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15 Data from Anne E. Casey Foundation. Maricopa County uninsured number
from What Matters in Greater Phoenix, Morrison Institute 1998.
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Q: What do we know about the programs 
created and the people being served by 
the Medically Needy Account?
A: For a handful of programs in the Medically
Needy Account, client and demographic data
have been collected well. For other programs,
however, data collection is lacking. In aggre-
gate, little can be said about the programs
and people served by the Medically Needy
Account. 
One of the primary challenges of this project was to 
compile data on the programs created by Proposition 200
tobacco tax revenue and the people affected by them in order
to generally assess the expenditures and their performance. A
casual perusal of the more than two-dozen past and present
line-item expenditures listed in the Medically Needy Account
(see Figure 5) begins to reveal the potential complexities of
data collection with this set of diverse programs. Indeed,
when this project began to focus on each of the Account’s
programs, line items, and the multitude of laws that created
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CHAPTER FOUR
An attempt to evaluate the overall or aggregate performance of the Medically
Needy Account is difficult because of the variety of programs and inconsistent
data available from them. In the final analysis, although some conclusions can 
be drawn about increased access to services in general, few conclusions can be
drawn about the quality or performance of the programs operating within the
Medically Needy Account. This is because a majority of the data is merely demo-
graphic information regarding the clientele served. 
Evaluations of tobacco tax programs should be conducted by a private entity, or
at least an independent entity outside of the agency charged with running and
administering the programs.
The basic “numbers served” information collected by many programs tells us that
expenditures in the Medically Needy Account are increasing access to healthcare
services in Arizona. In addition, the demographic data from a number of pro-
grams indicate that services are mostly being provided to the groups intended by
the initiative (the medically needy, medically indigent and low-income children).
Since 1995, Medically Needy Account funds have provided at least 150,000 
medical services.
While Arizona’s “smelly, puking habit” tobacco cessation campaign has proven
popular with the public, a September 1999 report by the Arizona Auditor General
was critical. The report stated that the campaign has done a poor job of quantify-
ing its effectiveness among youth because it failed to conduct a baseline survey
before initiating the campaign. Other evaluations have been more positive. 
However, despite Arizona’s difficulties in quantifying the cessation program’s
effectiveness, both California and Massachusetts have seen substantial decreases
in their per capita tobacco consumption following the imposition of a similar
cessation campaign. Based on case studies of the California and Massachusetts
experiences, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has concluded that the
combination of a tobacco cessation program and an increase in taxes is the 
most effective way to reduce tobacco consumption. Both factors are in place 
in Arizona following the 1994 passage of Proposition 200.
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them, the inconsistency of the data collection and evalua-
tion quickly appeared.
One of the first problems encountered with Medically
Needy Account program data is that some of the expenditures
simply defy data collection. Of the 26 program line items
listed in the Medically Needy Account16 (Figure 5), only 14
are expenditures or programs that provide some type of direct
medical or health care-related service to a client.17 The other
12 are expenditures that provide client service only indirectly,
such as the rural physician loan-payback program.
Obviously, for the programs through which clients only
receive indirect benefits, the only possible information to
know is who is being served categorically. For example,
because of eligibility criteria, we know that medically needy
or medically indigent mothers are the primary beneficiaries
of the funds allocated to the program to pay for the 48-hour
maternity length of stay program. Similarly, we can be 
sure that rural citizens are the beneficiaries of the rural 
physician loan payback program. But other line-item
expenditures – such as funds to offset the increases in costs
due to inflation – simply have no program performance
data to collect.
For many of the direct service programs created under the
Medically Needy Account, program performance data collec-
tion is sparse. At worst, data collection is nothing more than
a head count of persons served by the program. Within the
variety of programs, however, there are examples on both
ends of the spectrum: good and not so good. The common
denominator across the board seems to be decent output
data, but an overall lack of performance data and a lack 
of consistency with data collection.
An example is the organ transplant program. Created in
1995, the transplant program was the first and only program
to spend Medically Needy Account funds in 1995. Because
there was no required data collection mandated in the
enacting law, however, AHCCCS has collected information 
for its own purposes from the nine facilities that conduct the
transplant procedures. After four years of operating the pro-
gram, what can be said about the program? Between fiscal
year 1996 and the end of fiscal 1999, a total of 52 trans-
plants were conducted: 36 bone marrow, 6 liver, 5 heart, 3
lung, and 2 heart/lung. Basically, AHCCCS keeps track of
how many transplant operations have been conducted, the
type of transplantation operations conducted, how many
persons were Title XIX eligible and how many were 
medically needy/medically indigent, and how many are
approved and waiting. What is not revealed about the trans-
plant program is the “success” of the transplants, the health
status of the persons who received transplants, or anything
else that might provide insight into the “quality” or perfor-
mance of the program. In all fairness to AHCCCS, it was not
their mandate to collect this type of information, and it is
extremely difficult to do so.
The Arizona Department of Health Services annually pro-
duces a 200-plus page, statutorily-mandated “evaluation”
report regarding four programs under its administration:
Primary Care Program (parts a and b), the Children’s Hospi-
tal Program (also known as the Basic Children’s Medical
Services Program), the Telemedicine program, and the
Behavioral Health Program. The executive summary of the
thick report contains summary information on demograph-
ics and numbers served for each of the programs. The text 
of the report contains geographic information regarding 
services rendered (i.e., how many services delivered per
county, etc.), the most common services, and some client
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16 Figure 5 actually lists 31 line items, but 5 are transfers to other funds 
and programs.
17 For the purposes of this discussion, an example of a “direct client service” 
program is one that provides a specific service to a specific client, for example,
a heart transplant.
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with Medically Needy
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defy data collection.
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satisfaction data. Although some of the data in the report 
are useful in understanding the type of person who is being
served by the program, there is little information one can
use to assess the performance or quality of the programs
and/or what modifications might be undertaken to improve
the services.  
In addition, interviews conducted for this project revealed
that many persons find the DHS evaluation report of only
marginal use because of 1) the poor readability of the 
document, and 2) the fact that ADHS is evaluating its own
programs. Perhaps not surprisingly – given the fact that it
is in effect a self-evaluation – the report contains numerous
key accomplishments and success stories.  
It appears from interviews that only a relatively limited
audience outside of the Legislature read the report, and 
perhaps even fewer inside of the Legislature read it as well. 
In addition, as was mentioned earlier, the Legislative over-
sight committee that is supposed to receive this evaluation
report annually in November, has reportedly never met.  
The line-item allocation to DHS for this self-evaluation
report has been more than $240,000 annually for fiscal
years 1997-99, and has increased to $854,000 annually
beginning in FY2000. Clearly, to maximize this significant
expenditure and to improve usage and validity of this report,
the evaluation should be moved out of the agency to a pri-
vate, or at least independent, evaluator.
Other programs funded out of the Medically Needy
Account have better program data. The Premium Sharing
Project, which began as a pilot program, has been funded
with $20 million during each of fiscal years 1997-99. 
Premium Sharing has statutorily mandated data collection
and evaluation, which is conducted independently by 
Arizona Legislative Council. According to the law, a semi-
annual report must contain information about client
satisfaction, program enrollment information, average
annual income of the enrollee, total monies collected from
enrollees, and other information “necessary to analyze and
evaluate the project’s effectiveness or impact.”
The bottom line regarding data gathering for Medically
Needy Account expenditures is this: because of the wide 
disparities among enacting statutes, some programs collect
comprehensive data and provide some type of reporting regu-
larly, while others mandate less collect data collection, less
frequently. Still other programs, with virtually no guidance
from their enacting statutes, collect the kind and amount of
data they want to, when they want to. There is little coordina-
tion or consistency among the data collection for Medically
Needy Account programs. Further, several programs are self-
evaluated by the agency which administers them – a
situation which creates obvious credibility problems.
Q: What then can be said – in aggregate –
about the people and programs served by 
the Medically Needy Account expenditures?
A: About 150,000 medical services have been
rendered since 1995, although an average of
$96 million has annually gone unallocated.
Between FY1995 and the end of FY1999, just under $298
million was allocated in the Medically Needy Account and
more than 150,000 medical services were provided.18 As was
mentioned earlier in the document, an average of $90 mil-
lion has gone unallocated every year since 1995.
Although one might be tempted to immediately divide the
amount spent by the number of services rendered to obtain 
a cost “per medical service,” several things should be kept in
mind when doing so. First, roughly $75 million of the $298
million allocated during the first five years was deposited
into the rainy-day Medical Services Stabilization Fund,
where it has gone mostly unspent until $8 million was 
withdrawn in 1999. Second, not all services provided by the
programs are anywhere close to equal. For example, the cost
of a life-saving operation such as a heart or lung transplant
is – understandably – much more significant than the cost
of a child’s dental check-up at a community health center.
Figure 6 depicts the total allocations by programs within the
Medically Needy Account and the persons served by the pro-
grams, through FY1999.
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18 It is potentially inaccurate to say that 150,000 “persons” have been served
under the Medically Needy Account because many medically needy/medically
indigent persons could qualify as eligible for several programs and potentially
could have received service from more than one program.
PEOPLE AND PROGRAMS SERVED BY PROPOSITION 200
26
FIGURE 6 MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT
TOTAL PROGRAM ALLOCATIONS AND PERSONS SERVED THROUGH FY9919
Transfer to Medical Services Stab. Fund FY96, FY97, FY98, FY99 $73,315,400 No direct client service20
Transfer to Premium Sharing Project FY97, FY98, FY99 60,800,000 4,596
$10M Hospital Reimbursement FY97, FY98, FY99 30,000,000 No direct client service
Qualifying Community Health Centers FY96, FY97, FY98, FY99 20,079,000 64,963
Phase-Down of Quick Pay Discount FY97, FY98, FY99 20,048,000 No direct client service
Primary Care Programs FY96, FY97, FY98, FY99 19,957,900 39,200
Mental Health Programs for Non-Title XIX FY96, FY97, FY98, FY99 18,869,800 29,116
Offset Loss in Federal Funding FY97, FY98, FY99 10,708,400 No direct client service
Transfer to CHIP Fund FY99 9,251,000 11,452
Organ Transplants FY95, FY96, FY97, FY98, FY99 8,564,900 52
Basic Children’s Medical Services Program FY97, FY98, FY99 8,115,900 2,178
CHIP Direct Services FY99 8,000,000 (see CHIP Fund)
Maternity Length of Stay FY98, FY99 6,132,300 No direct client service
HIV/AIDS Treatment FY98, FY99 3,697,800 See footnote21
Primary Care Capital Construction FY98, FY99 2,636,200 No direct client service
Detoxification Services FY96, FY97, FY98, FY99 2,020,000 2,215
Transfer to DHS Health Crisis Fund FY98, FY99 1,862,800 No direct client service
HIV/AIDS Drug Assistance Program FY99 1,700,000 Approx. 570
Evaluations FY97, FY98, FY99 1,378,800 No direct client service
Telemedicine FY96, FY97, FY98, FY99 1,138,300 232
Transfer to DES Aging and Adult Admin. FY98, FY99 1,000,000 737
Public Health Education FY98 (begins again in FY2000) 957,600 No direct client service
Renal Disease Management FY97, FY98, FY99 660,000 Approx. 1,500 annually
Nonrenal Disease Management FY99 208,000 6
Rural Primary Care Provider Loan Repay Prog. FY98, FY99 69,000 No direct client service
Salome Health Services FY98 65,000 No direct client service
Community Health Centers Started FY2000
Ajo Health Services Started FY2000
SMI Non-Title XIX Psychotropic Meds Started FY2000
Psychotropic Medications (One-Time Allocation) Started FY2000
TOTAL $311,236,100 159,817
TOTAL NUMBER OF 
PROGRAM/EXPENDITURE YEARS OF ALLOCATIONS TOTAL SERVICES PROVIDED
ALLOCATIONS THROUGH FY99
19 Figures retrieved by Cannon & Gill; complied and presented by Morrison Institute for Public Policy.
20 In FY99, $8 million of the Medical Services Stabilization Fund was allocated to Healthcare Group, a state-sponsored pre-paid medical coverage program for small 
businesses and political subdivisions of the state with fewer than 50 employees. There were 12,546 members enrolled in Healthcare Group in July 1999.
21 An unduplicated count of members by year receiving protease inhibitors is not available from AHCCCS. An average of 250 members per month are reported by the
health plans to be receiving protease inhibitors for the Acute and the ALTCS programs.
PEOPLE AND PROGRAMS SERVED BY PROPOSITION 200
Q: Do we know if the populations targeted for
service by the Medically Needy Account are
measurably healthier because of the 
programs?
A: It is likely that some people are healthier 
(such as those who have received life-saving
transplants) because the Medically Needy
Account programs have increased the 
availability of a number of services.
Considering the tens of millions of dollars being spent 
annually on programs in the Medically Needy Account, a
reasonable and logical question seems: are the people being
served any healthier? Indeed, this basic question was among
the highest on the list of this research project at the outset.
However, as indicated in the previous section, the data and
evaluation information collected for this study make it diffi-
cult to say much of anything about the Medically Needy
Account programs, aside from the numbers of people served
and general demographic information about the persons
served. That is, some conclusions about individual program
outputs might be drawn, but little can be said about the
outcomes produced in Arizona by the programs. 
While the question of the level of “quality” or efficiency of
the programs is difficult to answer, the question of the Med-
ically Needy Account’s overall effectiveness might be
considered from a different perspective. Proposition 200 was
passed by the citizens of Arizona primarily to provide med-
ical services to low income children, medically needy and
medically indigent persons. We know, based on the basic
head-count data provided by the programs in the Medically
Needy Account, that thousands of low income children, med-
ically needy and medically indigent persons have received
services since 1995 because of the programs.  
Thus, have Proposition 200 programs been “effective” in
providing service to these needy populations? The only possi-
ble answer to that question is “yes” because an expansion of
the availability of services has occurred.  
And, based on that expansion of services, options, and the
numbers of people that have been served in the programs
(according to the program data), it is reasonable to assume
that a portion of the population defined as “medically indi-
gent or medically needy” in Arizona are at least somewhat
healthier by virtue of the fact that they are receiving services
where they might not have before – although quantifying
this supposition is difficult.  
Q: One of the other stated goals of Proposition
200 in 1994 was to reduce smoking and 
prevent youth smoking in Arizona. Has it
worked?
A: Evaluations of the Tobacco Education and 
Prevention Program (TEPP) have been mixed,
and Arizona’s youth smoking cessation efforts
have not yet been quantified. However, the
combination of tax increases and cessation
campaigns have worked well in other states.
During the past several years, tobacco consumption has
generally been decreasing throughout the United States for 
a variety of possible reasons, including cessation efforts and
increases in taxes and the cost of tobacco products.
Arizona’s now nationally-famous “smelly-puking-habit”
smoking cessation campaign (the Tobacco Education and
Prevention Program, or TEPP) is funded out of the second
largest account created by Proposition 200, the 23 percent
Health Education Account.22 While the creative anti-smok-
ing ads have now become a proud part of Arizona popular
culture, evaluations of it have been mixed.
A two-volume TEPP summary report was produced by a
private evaluation team for the Arizona Department of
Health Services. Generally, the report was complimentary to
the local coalition building and participation of the TEPP,
and suggested that these strong efforts would lead to tobacco
cessation and prevention. A January 1999 report by a
UofA/ASU team examined the media costs of the TEPP and
concluded that the public was recalling many of the cam-
paign’s advertisements, although a per-person cost
per-ad-recall was quite high as well.  
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22 The tobacco-industry-funded Tobacco Institute reported in 1999 that Arizona
per capita cigarette sales to those over age 14 dropped from 127 per year in
1980 to 66 per year in 1999.
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In September 1999, however, the Arizona Auditor General
was critical of the TEPP for not adequately quantifying its
effectiveness as a smoking deterrent. According to the report,
a baseline of youth tobacco use in Arizona was never con-
ducted prior to the launch of the campaign, thus making it
difficult to assess whether or not the prevention program is
working. The Auditor General report commented: “Evalua-
tion efforts since the Program’s 1995 inception have yielded
inconclusive results.”23 The report also stated TEPP has been
more successful at determining adult prevalence levels and
has taken steps to improve evaluation efforts. Evaluations of
the statewide advertising campaign and adult prevalence
rates are expected to be available in early 2000.
Despite the problems with measuring the possible effec-
tiveness of Arizona’s tobacco cessation campaign, several
other states have tobacco-prevention education campaigns
in place and have had success measuring decreases in 
tobacco usage.
California voters increased tobacco taxes with Proposition
99 in 1988 and Massachusetts voters did the same with a
ballot initiative in 1992. The implementation of statewide
anti-smoking campaigns in each state seems to have directly
contributed to greater reductions in per capita tobacco use
than the rest of the nation. From 1992 through 1996, per
capita tobacco consumption declined 19.7 percent in 
Massachusetts and 15.8 percent in California, but only about
6 percent in the rest of the nation.24
While the imposition of a tobacco tax has been proven
effective in some states in reducing tobacco consumption,
the Centers for Disease Control has concluded that a tax
increase combined with an antismoking campaign can be
more effective in reducing per capita tobacco consumption
than just a tax increase alone.25 Indeed, although a reduc-
tion in smoking prevalence in Arizona has yet to be strongly
proven by evaluation, it appears that what Arizona did by
passing Proposition 200 in 1994 – creating a tax increase
and an antismoking campaign – is likely to produce results.
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23 Arizona Auditor General, “Department of Health Services’ Tobacco Education
and Prevention Program,” Report No. 99-17, September 1999.
24 Centers for Disease Control. “Cigarette Smoking Before and After an Excise
Tax Increase and an Anti-Smoking Campaign – Massachusetts, 1990-1996”
1996; 45:966-70.
25 Ibid.
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FIRST, DECIDE ON A DESIRED IMPACT OR
IMPACTS.
Almost immediately after passage of Proposition 200, 
millions of dollars began to pour into the Medically Needy
Account. Initially, because of politics and the absence of a
plan, spending started slowly. But it did not take long before
politicians and special interests began to understand the
opportunity created by the significant sums of money. Soon,
the money was scattered in a complex patchwork of diverse
programs created under the medically needy heading.
As with the Proposition 200 revenues, the nearly $3 billion
scheduled to come to Arizona over the next 25 years repre-
sents an enormous opportunity for the state. Considering the
experience of Proposition 200, the question becomes a rather
simple one: should the state duplicate the politics-plus-
“shotgun blast” model that has occurred with the tobacco
tax money, or would the state be better served spending the
settlement in a more needs-based, “laser-guided” manner?
Although many have benefited from one or more of the 
programs created by Prop. 200, we believe the state would
undoubtedly be better served by looking at the settlement 
as a chance to do one or several significant things, whether
they are in health care or any of the other multitudes of 
possibilities proposed.
Should the state decide that the monies – or a large 
portion of the funds – would best be spent on the broad 
category of health care in Arizona, a comprehensive needs
assessment should be performed before allocating or 
dedicating the money to specific purposes. Such a needs
assessment will ensure that the revenue goes toward the
state’s actual needs, not just “pet” or perceived needs, 
as has occurred with many Prop. 200 programs.
Finally, when allocation of Arizona’s settlement monies
begins, the state should remain cognizant of the potential
shriveling up over the long term of the funds due to tobacco
company bankruptcy or substantial declines in tobacco con-
sumption – both of which are possible, and indeed, likely.
MAKE IT SIMPLE AND IMPLEMENT IT WELL.
One of the difficulties encountered in this research paper
with attempting to assess the overall performance of the
Tobacco Tax and Health Care Act was its complexity, particu-
larly in the Medically Needy Account. Funds are transferred
from one account to another, from one agency to the next,
and passed through different programs on their way to other
programs that – as noted previously – are treated very
inconsistently in areas such as data collection and reporting.
During the information collection phase of this research,
multiple contacts were necessary at multiple agencies and
within dozens of programs which, it seems, do not commu-
nicate with one another.  
In addition, because Legislative oversight has been lacking
for a variety of reasons, there has been little attention paid 
to the tobacco tax’s “big picture,” including the amount of
revenues available, large amounts of which continue to be
carried over from year to year. In many ways, it’s been 
political business as usual.
With potentially $3 billion at stake over 25 years, Arizona
would be wise to make sure that spending the tobacco 
settlement isn’t business as usual, and that the funds are
continually monitored and looked-after. If Arizona looks at
the tobacco settlement monies as a unique opportunity to
do one or two significant things, it will go a long way
toward 1) making a large impact and 2) simplifying 
implementation.  
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What are the lessons to be learned from Arizona’s five-year experience with
Proposition 200 (the Tobacco Tax and Health Care Act) and the Medically Needy
Account? Based on the findings of this report, there are four primary lessons that
can be taken forward as Arizona considers various options for spending its share
of the multi-state tobacco settlement.
But simplification might prudently go further. This is not
to imply that the creation of a new “tobacco” bureaucracy is
necessary in Arizona. Quite the contrary, it can simply mean
the establishment of a central point of departure for tobacco
settlement or the combination of tobacco settlement and
tobacco tax dollars. The trust fund, endowment, or founda-
tion concept being adopted in other states might work well
for this purpose, so long as strict guidelines are established
so that the funds cannot be simply raided the next time the
state’s general revenues decline.
By adopting this type of structure, disbursal of the monies
can be centralized, and program implementation and an
overarching purpose for data collection can reside in one
location, instead of several or even dozens. In addition, this
single location can be responsible for watching after the
“big picture” of the tobacco settlement in Arizona, some-
thing that is currently sorely missing with the millions of
dollars of tobacco tax.
As was stated previously, many of Proposition 200’s 
problems came in its implementation, which was mostly
half-hearted. Creating a plan and simplifying the structure
of implementation will go a long way toward improvement.
The last crucial step is implementation of the plan to an
excellence standard. Arizona should strive for implementa-
tion that is the model for other states regarding how to
spend tobacco settlement dollars. The plan and simplifica-
tion of implementation are important, but the commitment
to implementation excellence is also exceedingly important.
BE SMART ABOUT DATA COLLECTION AND
EVALUATION.
Data collection and evaluation were both included (as
noted, sporadically and inconsistently) at various times in
implementation of the Tobacco Tax and Health Care Act.
Often, however, it seemed to be merely data collection for 
the sake of data collection, inconsistent and barely usable.
Indeed, data collection – as seen in the implementation of
Proposition 200 – is too often seen as an adjunct to pro-
grams, in the same way that evaluation is frequently viewed
as a requirement to be thought about after the more impor-
tant work of implementation is done.  
The clear lesson from Prop. 200 is that whatever the state
decides to do with the settlement fund opportunity, data col-
lection and evaluation should be included prominently, and
thought about early on. It is critical that the Legislature
regards performance measurement as an integral part of 
any spending plan. 
What is “smart” data collection and evaluation? To be
most effective, data gathering and evaluation must be
addressed during program design by all stakeholders: 
legislators, program operations persons, and anyone else
interested in outcomes. Simply telling or legislatively man-
dating programs to report data on their projects without
actively involving them in the performance measurement
process, without explaining how and by whom the data are
going to be used can be counterproductive, and cause
bureaucratic resistance and possibly data corruption. 
Smart data collection design requires a discussion of: 
• program or outcome objectives,
• the potential sources of data, 
• potential problems that might be encountered,
• methods of data collection, and
• needed accuracy and reliability of the data.
A few considerations about data collection should guide
the design of performance or data indicators. Above all, the
data should measure results, not just processes, and the data
should focus on what the project or projects are actually
accomplishing. Stated simply, the primary focus should be to
know 1) what the programs are doing and 2) whether they
are doing any good.
Date collection for the sake of data collection does not 
benefit anyone or any program. The benefits of using perfor-
mance data must at least equal the cost of collecting them.
Some projects and programs can provide good information 
at a low cost by using existing data, sampling techniques,
appraisal methods, and other creative collection methods. 
If possible, data monitoring and evaluation design should
build on the reporting arrangements already in place. 
Finally, providing funds to agencies to evaluate their own
programs is not smart. Private, or at least outside data col-
lection – as has occurred with the Tobacco Education and
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Prevention Program – has worked well so far and has been
objective. In the end, data collection, studies and surveys,
data analysis, and results reporting need to be independent
and they need to occur in a format that is relevant, readable,
and understandable by all stakeholders.
WATCH IMPLEMENTATION CLOSELY.
One final lesson learned from Arizona’s Proposition 200
experience is that regardless of how the language of a ballot
initiative is written or the law devised for implementation,
politics will almost certainly find their way into the process.
According to the interviews conducted for this project, the
supporters of Proposition 200 believed that they had drafted
an initiative that was essentially “self-enacting” with lan-
guage that would completely bypass and avoid politics.
Ultimately, they were proven wrong.
Thus, perhaps a key lesson for Arizona voters, consumer
and public law advocates, and the media is to keep a close
eye on how any law or initiative passed in Arizona is imple-
mented over time by the Legislature. If the Proposition 200
history is any guide, those who do not get what they want
from the settlement might be tempted to stymie decision-
making, or even undermine the final spending decisions.
Keeping watch over how the money is spent and imple-
mented will not only ensure that the will of the people is
carried out, but it will probably also increase the impact of
the funds, and in the long run, improve the public’s trust in
their elected officials.
While Arizona’s temptations to spend the significant
tobacco settlement money are many and varied, the State
will do well to consider the experience of implementing
1994’s Proposition 200 tobacco tax increase and the lessons
that can be learned from it. By not paying attention to and
learning these lessons, it is possible that Arizona will wel-
come the year 2025 without remembering the opportunity
presented by the multi-state tobacco settlement of 1998.
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ARIZONA AND THE MULTI-STATE TOBACCO SETTLEMENT
Q: How did the multi-state tobacco settlement
come about?
A: After Mississippi and several other states filed
and then settled liability lawsuits with several
large tobacco companies in the mid-1990s, 46
states (including Arizona) filed suit and even-
tually reached a settlement in 1998.
In early 1994, a coalition calling itself “Arizona for a
Healthy Future” began collecting signatures to place the
Tobacco Tax and Health Care Act (Proposition 200) on the
Arizona ballot in November. Although the potential ballot
initiative signaled yet another threat to tobacco, the industry
was facing several other threats, and at significantly higher
stakes than what was being discussed in Arizona.
On April 14, 1994, representatives of the largest tobacco
manufacturers in the U.S. stood before a Congressional
committee and swore under oath that they did not believe
that nicotine in cigarettes was an addictive substance and
that they did not actively market their products to young
people. The testimony made front-page news. According to
one commentator, the tobacco executives’ testimony was 
“so incredible and unbelievable that the (tobacco) industry’s
traditional arguments – about the whole issue of choice –
were tainted even in the eyes of people who wanted to be
rational about cigarette companies.”26 After successfully
fighting off numerous lawsuits over the decades, the tobacco
industry suddenly seemed vulnerable.
On May 23, 1994, a little more than a month after the
Capitol Hill hearing, Mississippi filed suit against the
tobacco industry to recover Medicaid expenditures for
tobacco-related illnesses. In filing this first-of-its-kind suit,
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The multi-state settlement agreement signed in November 1998 was the culmina-
tion of several years of litigation and negotiation between the Attorneys General
of 46 states and the major tobacco producers in the U.S. Arizona’s share of the
settlement is projected to be approximately $3 billion over the next 25 years,
with so-called “up front” payments of roughly $171 million during the first five
years. The amount of payments ultimately received in Arizona is subject to many
variables, most of which would cause the settlement amount to be less than 
projected today.
The settlement requires states to achieve State Specific Finality (state court
approval) before receiving any funds, and at least 80 percent of the states in the
agreement representing 80 percent of the funds need to achieve State Specific
Finality before any state receives any money. If a state does not achieve Finality
by the end of 2001, it will receive no funds. Arizona’s State Specific Finality is
currently being held up by a pending lawsuit filed by the state’s counties, who 
are seeking a portion of the funds.
Although Arizona has not yet decided how to spend its portion of the settlement,
many other states have. A number have looked at or adopted an overarching
structure such as a trust fund, endowment, or a foundation to receive and decide
how the money is to be spent. Several states – including Michigan – have created
funds that allow a non-legislative board discretion in spending some or a large
portion of the money. As far as actually spending the money, the ideas brought
forward in states range from broad healthcare and tobacco cessation to prescrip-
tion drug assistance for the elderly, to college scholarships, to technology
infrastructure, to a “troubled youth” program. 
ov
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26 Quote from John Scanlon, a long-time public relations official for the tobacco
industry, as quoted in Policy.com, “The Tobacco Settlement,” April 16, 1998.
the Attorney General of Mississippi claimed his motivation
was the state’s taxpayers: “I (seek to) spare Mississippi tax-
payers from paying medical bills that are the tobacco
companies’ responsibility.”27 The states of Florida, Texas and
Minnesota quickly followed Mississippi’s lead and filed their
own suits, and the four eventually reached a $40 billion 
settlement with the tobacco industry.  
In 1996, Arizona Attorney General Grant Woods filed suit
against the tobacco companies, and by 1997, a total of forty-
six states and a number of U.S. territories had also followed
the lead of Mississippi. All sought payment from the industry
giants for the costs their states had absorbed for treating
tobacco-related illness.  
The protracted court battle and closed-door negotiations
that ensued led to a historic November 1998 signing of a
$206 billion multi-state settlement agreement. 
Q: Who are the parties to the agreement and
what specifically does the settlement call for?
A: 46 states and four tobacco companies signed
the agreement in November 1998. Among
other things, the settlement calls for financial
payments to the states in perpetuity. 
The attorneys general of 46 states (including Arizona) and
several U.S. territories signed the settlement agreement. The
four tobacco companies who signed the original agreement
account for more than 95 percent of total cigarette sales in
the United States. They are Brown & Williamson, Lorrillard
Tobacco Company, Phillip Morris, and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company. Several smaller tobacco manufacturers have
joined in the settlement since late 1998, such that the com-
panies involved in the agreement now account for greater
than 99 percent of total national cigarette sales.
While the details of the “Master Settlement” are somewhat
complex, the overarching concepts of the settlement agree-
ment are straightforward. The states’ Attorneys General
dropped more than 40 pending lawsuits and agreed not to
sue to recover Medicaid-related expenses in the future. In
exchange, the tobacco companies consented to pay roughly
$200 billion in payments to the states over the next 25 years,
and agreed to restrict their tobacco marketing efforts and
put new efforts into reducing tobacco consumption by youth. 
Q: What is Arizona’s anticipated share of the
tobacco settlement, and when will the money
begin to flow into the state?
A: Arizona could receive as much as $3 billion
over 25 years. Because of a pending appeal 
by the state’s counties, however, it is unclear
when and/or if the money might start to flow.
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27 “Attorney General Files Groundbreaking Lawsuit Against Tobacco Cartel, 
Affiliated Organizations,” Mississippi Office of the Attorney General (press
release), May 23, 1994.
FIGURE 7 MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
PAYMENTS TO STATES
Tobacco manufacturers will make payments to the states in
perpetuity, with a total of approximately $206 billion during
the next 25 years.
FOUNDATION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
The tobacco industry will contribute $1.4 billion over the next
five years for a national advertising and education campaign
about tobacco. In addition, the industry will fund and create a
$250 million foundation that will develop an advertising and
education program to discourage tobacco use, especially
among teens.
ADVERTISING AND EVENT SPONSORSHIP 
LIMITATIONS
Tobacco manufacturers will no longer use outdoor advertising
or apparel and merchandise with product logos to market their
brands. In addition, they will no longer target youth in adver-
tising or use cartoon characters in ads. Sponsorship of events 
is limited to one brand-name sponsorship per year.
INDUSTRY RESTRICTIONS
The tobacco industry will discontinue funding the Tobacco
Institute and disband it, and lobbyists for the industry are pro-
hibited from opposing proposed laws intended to limit youth
access or usage of tobacco.
DOCUMENT DISCLOSURE
The tobacco manufacturers will open a website that includes
the full content of all documents released during or related to
any smoking/health-related lawsuit.
Source: California Legislative Analyst’s Office, “The Tobacco Settlement,” 
January 14, 1999.
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Under the disbursement terms worked out by the collective
group of Attorneys General, Arizona’s portion of the settle-
ment is scheduled to be roughly $2.9 billion over the first 25
years of the agreement. The first series of disbursements, the
so-called “up front” payments, will total roughly $177 mil-
lion during the first five years. A second stream of payments,
which may begin sometime in 2000, will bring annual pay-
ments of $59 million to the state. These annual payments
are expected to grow to $118 million per year by fiscal year
2018, to a total of $2.8 billion by 2025. However, the settle-
ment stipulates that payments to the states will continue
indefinitely into the future, so long as tobacco products are
consumed in the United States. Thus, it is possible that 
Arizona’s settlement revenue may not end after 2025.
The beginning of financial payments to Arizona depends
on a number of legal steps that are required both in Arizona
and the other states. Each
state that is a party to the
settlement is required to
submit the agreement to
state courts for approval,
although the settlement
does not require any
explicit action be taken by
the state legislature. When
the agreement is approved by the state courts, the state is
said to have reached “State Specific Finality.”
Funding does not automatically begin to flow at that
point, however. Other provisions of the settlement provide
that at least 80 percent of the states participating in the
agreement representing at least 80 percent of total amount
of funds in the settlement must reach “State Specific Final-
ity” before the monies begin to be disbursed. However, the
agreement also provides that the initial payments will begin
to flow on June 30, 2000 to any state that has reached “State
Specific Finality” even if the 80 percent/80 percent threshold
is not met by that date. Any state without finality by Decem-
ber 31, 2001 will receive no settlement funds.
As of the end of September 1999, the 80/80 threshold
cleared a significant hurdle when a group challenging the
agreement in California decided not to appeal a lower court
ruling against them. The decision cleared the way for final-
ity in the largest state in the agreement. With California and
New York at or near finality, it appears that funds will proba-
bly begin flowing prior to June 30, 2000.
As of the end of 1999, Arizona is one of eight states that
have not yet reached finality. The states that have not
reached “State Specific Finality” are Arizona, Alabama,
Arkansas, Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee 
and Virginia.
Q: Why has Arizona not yet reached State 
Specific Finality?
A: The lawsuit filed by a number of Arizona
counties is holding up Arizona’s State Specific
Finality.
In early 1999, 14 of Arizona’s 15 counties (excluding
Pima) filed suit to claim an up-front share of the state’s
tobacco settlement funds. The counties claimed that most 
of the costs which the Attorney General sought to recover for
the state in his original lawsuit against the tobacco industry
had been paid for by the counties. In addition, they argued,
when Attorney General Grant Woods filed his suit on behalf
of the state and its “political subdivisions,” the counties were
implied as a party to the suit.
Therefore, the counties said they were entitled to a direct
share of the state’s settlement money, about 32 percent of 
the total settlement dollars. On March 3rd, 1999, however, 
a Maricopa County Superior Court Judge rejected the claims
of the counties, saying, “One line (referring to political sub-
divisions) in a 300-paragraph complaint does not make the
counties parties.”28
But the counties appealed the decision, and the unresolved
appeal remains as the primary stumbling block in Arizona’s
quest for State Specific Finality. If the suit is not resolved by
December 31, 2001, the state will not be a party to the settle-
ment and will forfeit its entire portion of the settlement.
In California, a similar problem was averted because sev-
eral county jurisdictions (including Los Angeles and San
Francisco Counties) had filed their own lawsuits against the
tobacco companies prior to the settlement agreement. Three
months before the multi-state agreement was announced in
November 1998, the California Attorney General entered into
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the local
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28 Quote of Judge Barry Schenider. McCloy, Mike, “Tobacco Fund Plea is Denied;
Maricopa County Loses Bid for Up-Front Money,” The Arizona Republic,
March 4, 1999.
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governments to coordinate their lawsuits and the potential
settlement. As a result of that MOU, an even 50-50 split of
the revenue will occur between the state and the local gov-
ernments that sign on to the deal. Thus, of the estimated 
$1 billion in annual payments expected, the state will
receive $500 million and the local governments will receive
$500 million.
Q: If and when the money does begin to flow
into Arizona, are there any restrictions
regarding how it can be spent?
A: There are essentially no restrictions regarding
how the state can spend the money – it can
be used for any purpose.
The settlement agreement imposes no restrictions regard-
ing the use of the money by the states. The agreement did
not mandate that the money be spent on public health pro-
grams, tobacco prevention, or any other specific purpose. The
funds may be used as state matching funds for Medicaid.
In addition, under the terms of the agreement, no specific
action is required by the state legislature to begin receiving
the money. However, under law, the money will be deposited
into each state’s general fund, which is appropriated by the
Legislature and the Governor.
As mentioned above, there are only two things required to
begin receiving money in Arizona immediately: State Spe-
cific Finality (approval of the settlement in state court with
no appeals pending) and completion of the 80/80 (80 per-
cent of states/80 percent of the total monies) provision.
Q: Aside from achieving State Specific Finality, 
is there anything else that might reduce the
amount of revenue scheduled to be received
in Arizona?
A: There are some provisions of the settlement
agreement that could substantially reduce
how much money is ultimately received in 
Arizona.
In the short run, Arizona needs to resolve the dispute with
the counties and then achieve State Specific Finality to begin
receiving money. Over the long run, however, there are a
number of possible factors that could reduce the amount of
money from the multi-state tobacco settlement that comes
into Arizona, although there is one factor that could actually
increase the amount. Nevertheless, it is possible – indeed
probable – that much less than the estimated $3 billion in
total payments will materialize in Arizona.
According to the settlement agreement, smaller payments
to the states could result if Congress enacts legislation prior
to November 30, 2002 that mandates payments by the
tobacco companies (through settlement or tax) which the
federal government then makes available to the states for
tobacco-related, health-related, or other unrestricted pur-
poses. Thus, under this scenario, the net amount of revenue
to Arizona might remain the same, but new federal restric-
tions could be imposed regarding the spending of the money.
The settlement also stipulates that if the federal govern-
ment successfully seeks reimbursement from the tobacco
companies for its tobacco-related Medicaid costs (either by
seeking a piece of the states’ settlement or by filing suit
against tobacco companies in federal court), the amount 
of revenue to each state would be lowered.
The agreement also allows the tobacco companies to
reduce the payments they make to the states if there is a sig-
nificant drop in the nationwide sales of cigarettes. Each year,
the amount of the payments to the states will be adjusted
based on the volume of cigarettes shipped within the U.S. 
If the volume decreases, the amount of settlement will
decrease. The likelihood of this provision affecting the total
revenue disbursed is fairly high, particularly in light of
recent increases in the price of tobacco products. 
Further, in the event of a bankruptcy of one or more of the
tobacco companies who signed the agreement, the payments
to the states would decrease. It is important to note that 
several signers of the agreement are manufacturing sub-
sidiaries of larger U.S. corporations. The larger parent
corporations would not be responsible for settlement pay-
ments in the event that a subsidiary files for bankruptcy.
According to the agreement, there is one possibility that
the payments to states could increase, although the actuality
of more revenue is somewhat of a long shot considering the
other provisions mentioned above. Payments are scheduled
to be adjusted upward annually to inflation by either a flat
three percent, or the national Consumer Price Index,
whichever is greater. Thus, if the provision regarding the
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decreased volume of cigarettes shipped in the U.S. does not
cause a decrease in the payments, it is possible that the states
will receive more money due to an inflation adjustment.
Q: How might Arizona structure and spend the
settlement? 
A: The possibilities are many. Some states (such
as Florida) are creating endowments or trust
funds and spending only the interest. Others
(such as Michigan) are making both one-time
urgent need allocations, and on-going expen-
ditures. In between, expenditures run the
gamut.
Because the settlement places no restrictions on how indi-
vidual states may spend the funds, how to spend the money
has become a popular topic in virtually all states that are a
party to the settlement agreement, Arizona included. Since
the settlement was announced, Governor Hull’s office has
reportedly received several dozen recommendations for how
to spend the settlement that, all totaled would reach several
hundred million dollars.
A number of national and local-level advocates have
worked hard to have the monies earmarked in each state for
specific purposes such as health programs, cessation, preven-
tion and education. In some instances the funds have been
designated for these purposes, but in other states, unique
approaches to spending the monies have emerged. Before
reviewing how a number of other states have chosen to spend
their portion of the money, however, some consideration
should be given to possible overarching structures created to
administer the funds when they are eventually spent.  
A number of states are considering or already have estab-
lished either a trust fund, an endowment, or a foundation 
to oversee and administer their expected tobacco settlement
dollars.29 Although similar in concept, trust funds, 
endowments and foundations can differ in intent and imple-
mentation. And indeed, definitions of each are often broad
and imprecise, and the terms are sometimes used inter-
changeably. Each concept, however, can provide a way to
manage and administer the funds outside of the regular
state appropriations process, if that is what is desired.
Several states have created a trust fund for settlement 
dollars, generally to set aside some or all of the revenue for 
a specific purpose (Alabama has created the Children’s First
Trust Fund and Michigan has established the Merit Award
Trust Fund). The purpose of the trust fund can vary accord-
ing the goals established by the state. Often, they are broadly
defined and governed by an instrument with guiding princi-
pals that directs expenditures. In the case of Alabama, the
state treasury will maintain the account, and the Juvenile
Justice Coordinating Council will oversee disbursements. In
Michigan, a 14-member board will guide expenditures from
the Merit Award Trust fund, and the Michigan Strategic Fund
Agency will administer the fund. 
An endowment is generally used when attempting to pre-
serve a base amount of funds over a long period of time, or in
perpetuity. The goal is long-term stability and viability. Usu-
ally, an endowment is structured so that only the interest
income is spent on a specific purpose or purposes, as specified
in a charter or governing instrument. Endowments may be
either a stand-alone entity, or part of an institution (such as a
university). Florida has established the Lawton Chiles
Tobacco Endowment for Children and Elders with its tobacco
settlement monies, which have already begun to flow. The
state’s Board of Administration manages the funds and has
the authority to spend the interest from the funds in a man-
ner similar to how it invests the state’s retirement funds on
children’s health, child welfare, and elder programs. Over the
first four years, the endowment is expected to set aside more
than $2 billion. In Minnesota, where funds are also already
flowing, Governor Ventura has created a foundation and three
endowments in an effort to preserve the money in perpetuity.
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29 Much of this discussion is from “The Tobacco Settlement: States Propose 
Trust Funds, Endowments and Foundations,” by the National Governor’s 
Association, 1999.
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While trust funds and endowments are often the equiva-
lent of “special reserve” accounts, a foundation is an actual
non-profit, philanthropic entity, frequently established to
manage trust funds or endowments. Often, a foundation
provides grants to other nonprofit organizations to carry out
its specific goals. In Virginia, the Tobacco Settlement Foun-
dation has been created to oversee the trust fund established
to prevent youth tobacco use. Alabama’s Children’s First
Trust Fund is managed by the Children’s First Foundation.
The Juvenile Justice Coordinating Council and the founda-
tion jointly are trustees for the fund.
With the uncertainty of the future payments to states due
to the factors mentioned previously, trust funds, endowments
and foundations are becoming increasingly popular ideas
because they have the potential of protecting some of the
funds for future uses. In the absence of one of these struc-
tures or another similar concept, the settlement revenues –
by provision in the agreement – will be deposited in the
state’s general fund.
With many states having achieved State Specific Finality,
the debate over how to spend the settlement monies is quite
advanced or even completed in many places. The states’
responses to the settlement opportunity have been as diverse
as the states themselves. In addition to the common expen-
ditures on health care and tobacco cessation, some have
considered using the tobacco settlement to pay for college
scholarships (Michigan), water projects (North Carolina),
debt reduction (Louisiana), sidewalk repair (Los Angeles),
juvenile detention facilities (Alabama), and reductions in
automobile, property, and income taxes. A sampling of what
a number of states have already decided to do with their 
settlement revenue follows.30
FLORIDA
In May 1999, the Lawton Chiles Endowment Fund was
created. $1.7 billion will be deposited into the fund over four
years, and only the interest will be spent on children’s health
care, child welfare, and community-based service initiatives
for the elderly.
HAWAII
In July 1999, the Hawaii Tobacco Settlement Special Fund
was created to receive all settlement revenues. Emergency
and Budget Reserve Fund (a rainy day reserve) will receive
40 percent of funds; the Department of Health will receive 35
percent for health related programs, including the children’s
health insurance program; and the Tobacco Prevention and
Control Trust Fund will receive 25 percent for youth and
adult education, prevention, and cessation programs, and
chronic diseases.
MICHIGAN
In 1999, a number of one-time and on-going appropria-
tions were agreed to. One-time appropriations include: $75
million for “Michigan Technical Education Center Expan-
sion” for vocational education training; $10 million for
“Long-Term Health Care Innovation Grants” for quality of
life enhancements for residents in nursing homes. On-going
appropriations include $86.3 million for “Michigan Merit
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FIGURE 8 TRUST FUNDS, ENDOWMENTS,
AND FOUNDATIONS
TRUST FUND
Usually created to reserve or target revenue for specific pur-
poses. There are multiple oversight and management options,
from a separate, designated account in the state treasury that is
appropriated through the annual appropriation process, or an
account that is overseen by a board or commission outside of
the appropriation process. The states of Alabama, Michigan,
Virginia and Washington have all established trust funds for
their tobacco settlement monies.
ENDOWMENT
Usually created to preserve a base of funds for a long period of
time or in perpetuity. Generally, only the interest income or a
portion of the income is spent, as designated in the charter or
governing instrument. The states of Florida and Minnesota
have created endowments with tobacco settlement revenues.
FOUNDATION
A non-profit entity usually created to aid and maintain chari-
table activities. A foundation can be established to disburse the
funds of a trust fund or an endowment. Alabama and Virginia
have created foundations to oversee the trust funds established,
and Minnesota created a foundation to manage almost half of
the state’s up front payments.
Source: National Governor’s Association, 1999
30 Much of the following information came from two sources: 
www.tobaccofreekids.org and the National Governor’s Association
(www.nga.org).
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Awards” from the Michigan Merit Award Trust Fund. The
Michigan Merit Awards provide for scholarships for Michigan
students who achieve a designated test score of the Michigan
EAP test during their junior year in high school. A qualify-
ing student will receive a $2,500 one-time scholarship. $50.0
million to be administered by the Michigan Strategic Fund
Agency. The funds are to be distributed by an appointed
board of 14 members who will distribute 40 percent to basic
research in health-related areas, 50 percent to collaborative
research, and 10 percent to support commercial develop-
ment of health research in the State. Also created: $30
million “Senior Prescription Drug Program” to provide pre-
scription drug coverage for senior citizens whose household
income is below 200 percent of the federal poverty level; $5
million “Personal Needs Allowance” raises from $30 to $60
per month the amount of income a Medicaid-eligible senior
citizen can keep for personal expenditures in a nursing
home; and, $3 million for a “Long-Term Care Advisor” to
better assist senior citizens in making choices concerning
long-term health care.
MISSISSIPPI
In April, 1999, the Mississippi Health Care Trust Fund and
the Health Care Expendable Fund were created. The Expend-
able Fund may only be spent on health-related purposes,
including Medicaid; SCHIP; community-based care for the
elderly; and improvement of the health of school-age 
children. A board of directors will monitor and advise 
investments and expenditures.
MONTANA
The State of Montana’s settlement funds were allocated by
the 1999 Legislature for the 2000-2001 biennium. 25 percent
of the funds will be allocated to health-related issues,
including the SCHIP, the Tobacco Use Prevention Program,
and the Montana Comprehensive Health Association (a
high-risk insurance pool). The remaining 75 percent of 
the funds are authorized for a “reserve fund,” the Montana
National Guard Challenge Program for troubled youth, and
the state’s general fund.
NEBRASKA
The State of Nebraska has created a Tobacco Settlement
Trust Fund, where all tobacco settlement funds are to be
deposited and invested. Interest from the trust fund is paid
into the Excellence in Health Care Trust Fund, and a six-
member Excellence in Health Care Trust Fund Council,
appointed by the Governor and approved by the Legislature,
is authorized to make grants for any of the following pur-
poses 1) public health services, 2) the statewide trauma
system and emergency medical services, 3) education, 
retention and recruitment of primary care professionals,
behavioral health professionals, and nurses for medically
underserved areas, 4) health infrastructure development
supportive of telemedicine capability, 5) conversion of 
nursing facilities to assisted living or alternative care, 
6) conversion of rural hospitals to limited-service hospitals,
7) development and expansion of community-based aging
services, and 8) state matching share for CHIP. The Council’s
loan guarantee and grant decisions are subject to the
approval of the Director of Health and Human Services
Finance and Support.
NEVADA
In 1999, the governor signed two bills related to the
tobacco settlement. The first directs 40 percent of the settle-
ment to the Millennium Scholarship program, which will
provide $2,500 per year for four years to students enrolled in
a Nevada state university who graduated from a Nevada high
school with a 3.0 GPA or higher. Smaller scholarships will
also be provided to students choosing to attend one of
Nevada’s community colleges. The second bill created two
funds: the Fund for a Healthy Nevada, into which 50 percent
of the tobacco money is deposited; and the Trust Fund for
Public Health, into which the remaining 10 percent of the
money is deposited. The Fund for a Healthy Nevada may be
used for programs that improve health services for children,
senior citizens, and persons with disabilities, to reduce or
prevent the use of tobacco, alcohol, or drugs, and the Gover-
nor’s program for pharmaceutical assistance to low-income
seniors. The Trust Fund for Public Health may be used for
grants for health programs for children, seniors, and the dis-
abled; and research on prevention and treatment of illness.
NEW JERSEY
In 1999, the governor’s FY 2000 budget proposal was
approved by the state legislature, including direction of
spending the tobacco settlement monies. Of the roughly 
$93 million in settlement funds expected in year one, $18.5
million will be dedicated to anti-smoking programs. The
remaining revenues will are allocated to wellness programs,
long-term care alternatives, enhanced mental health ser-
vices, pharmaceutical assistance to the aged and disabled,
and medical services for those on general assistance.
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NORTH CAROLINA
In March 1999, two trust funds and a non-profit corpora-
tion to assist farming communities were created. 50 percent
of settlement payments will be allocated to the nonprofit
Corporation for Economic Impact Assistance to Tobacco
Dependent Regions of the State. 25 percent will go to a trust
fund to be established by the General Assembly to assist
tobacco producers, allotment holders, and persons engaged
in tobacco-related businesses, and 25 percent will go to a
trust fund to be established by the General Assembly for
health-related purposes.
NORTH DAKOTA
In April 1999, the Tobacco Settlement Trust Fund was 
created. The principal and interest of the fund will be 
re-allocated to three other trust funds: 45 percent to the
Resources Trust Fund “to address the long-term water needs
of the state.” 45 percent to the Common Schools Trust Fund
to provide additional state funding to local school districts,
and the final 10 percent to the Community Health Trust
Fund to be appropriated for community-based public health
programs, including tobacco prevention.
OKLAHOMA
In July 1999, the governor announced his desire to use 
the state’s tobacco settlement on bolstering technology,
infrastructure, and improvements in the education system
including teacher pay raises, and tobacco prevention.
TEXAS
In June 1999, a permanent fund for tobacco education
and enforcement was created, including a $10 million per
year appropriation to the Texas Department of Health for
programs to reduce the use of cigarettes and tobacco prod-
ucts. Governor Bush also signed legislation in 1999 to create
the Tobacco Settlement Permanent Trust Fund. An Invest-
ment Advisory Committee will be established to advise the
state comptroller on managing the assets of the fund.
WYOMING
The Wyoming Tobacco Settlement Trust Fund was created
in early 1999. All incoming tobacco settlement monies will
be placed in an endowment and only the interest income
will be spent on programs related to health or school- and
community-based tobacco prevention programs.
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APPENDIX A:
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APPENDIX B:
Tobacco Project Advisory Committee
APPENDIX C:
Text of Proposition 200
APPENDIX D:
Tobacco Tax-Related Legislation in Arizona, 1995-99
APPENDIX E:
Medically Needy Account Program Descriptions
APPENDIX F:
Tobacco Tax Medically Needy Account Funds, FY 1995-05
PERSONS INTERVIEWED FOR THIS PROJECT*
APPENDIX A
Persons interviewed:
SHIRLEY ANDERSON, former Senate Health Committee Analyst
JASON BEZOZO, Arizona State Senate
SEN. RUSSELL “RUSTY” BOWERS
SUPERVISOR JAN BREWER, District 4, Maricopa County
BARBARA BURKHOLDER, Arizona Public Health Association
PETER BURNS, PJB Wakonda Group
KEVIN DeMENNA, DeMenna & Associates
REP. LAURA KNAPEREK
ANDY GORDON, attorney
SEN. SUSAN GRACE
REP. HERSCHELLA HORTON
LAURIE LANGE, Arizona Hospital and Healthcare Association
MATT MADONNA, American Cancer Society
BRIAN McNEIL, Arizona Corporation Commission
DANA NAMARK, Children’s Action Alliance
NORMAN PETERSEN, Arizona Department of Health Services
MARGARET STEMMLER, Children’s Action Alliance
RICK POTTER, William M. Mercer, Inc.
ANDY RINDE, Arizona Association of Community Health Centers
JOHN RIVERS, Arizona Hospital and Healthcare Association
MONSIGNOR EDWARD RYLE
BETH SCHERMER, attorney
REP. DAN SCHOTTEL
MARTIN SCHULTZ, Arizona Public Service Company
SHELLI SILVER, Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System
DON THAYER, Arizona Legislative Counsel
MARTIN VAN DER WERF, The Arizona Republic
JENNIFER VERMEER, Joint Legislative Budget Committee
DEBI WELLS, Office of Governor Hull
* Interviews were completed either in person or over the telephone. Those who declined to be interviewed are not listed here.
TOBACCO PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
APPENDIX B
Persons invited to attend:
SEN. GUS ARZBERGER
SEN. RUSSELL “RUSTY” BOWERS
CAROLYN COSSON, Coalition for a Tobacco Free Arizona*
SEN. GEORGE CUNNINGHAM
REP. LORI DANIELS
SEN. ANN DAY
REP. SUE GERARD*
SEN. RANDALL GNANT
REP. HERSHELLA HORTON
REP. KAREN JOHNSON
DAVID LANDRITH, Arizona Medical Association*
LAURIE LANGE, Arizona Hospital and Healthcare Association*
REP. ANDY NICHOLS
REP. JIM WEIERS
DEBI WELLS, Office of Governor Hull*
* Indicates attended one or both meetings, or sent a representative to one or both meetings. 
All others did not attend a meeting, but were invited.
TEXT OF PROPOSITION 200
APPENDIX C-1
PROPOSITION 200 
PROPOSED BY INITIATIVE PETITION
OFFICIAL TITLE
AMENDING TITLE 42, CHAPTER 7, ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES, BY ADDING ARTICLES 1.2 AND 1.3; RELATING TO
TOBACCO TAXES TO PROVIDE FOR HEALTH CARE SERVICES FOR THE MEDICALLY NEEDY, MEDICALLY INDIGENT AND LOW
INCOME CHILDREN, TOBACCO RELATED EDUCATION AND RESEARCH AND ADJUSTMENT TO CORRECTIONS FUND, USE OF
TAX MONIES TO SUPPLEMENT EXISTING FUNDS AND LEVELS OF SERVICE, TOBACCO TAX LEVY ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS
AND RELATED EXEMPTIONS; AND PROVIDING FOR SEVERABILITY.
DESCRIPTIVE TITLE
AN ACT REQUIRING AN INCREASE IN STATE TAX ON CIGARETTES, CIGARS AND OTHER TOBACCO PRODUCTS, INCLUDING
THOSE SOLD ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS, EXEMPTING THOSE SOLD TO ENROLLED MEMBERS OF THE INDIAN TRIBE, TO
PROVIDE HEALTH CARE FOR MEDICALLY INDIGENT, MEDICALLY NEEDY OR LOW INCOME CHILDREN, TOBACCO RELATED
EDUCATION AND RESEARCH.
PROPOSITION 200
A “yes” vote shall have the effect of increasing the state tax on cigarettes, cigars and other tobacco products to provide for
health care for the medically indigent, medically needy or low income children, tobacco related education and research.
A “no” vote shall have the effect of not increasing the state tax on cigarettes, cigars and other tobacco products.
PROPOSITION 200
OFFICIAL TITLE
AN INITIATIVE MEASURE
AMENDING TITLE 42, CHAPTER 7, ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES, BY ADDING ARTICLES 1.2 AND 1.3; RELATING TO
TOBACCO TAXES TO PROVIDE FOR HEALTH CARE SERVICES FOR THE MEDICALLY NEEDY, MEDICALLY INDIGENT AND LOW
INCOME CHILDREN, TOBACCO RELATED EDUCATION AND RESEARCH AND ADJUSTMENT TO CORRECTIONS FUND, USE OF
TAX MONIES TO SUPPLEMENT EXISTING FUNDS AND LEVELS OF SERVICE, TOBACCO TAX LEVY ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS
AND RELATED EXEMPTIONS; AND PROVIDING FOR SEVERABILITY.
TEXT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT
Be it enacted by the people of the State of Arizona:
The following amendments to provide for a tobacco tax for health care purposes are proposed to become valid when
approved by a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon and on proclamation of the governor:
Section 1. Declaration of policy
A. The people of Arizona believe it is in the best interest of Arizona to establish state funds dedicated to provide health
care programs and services, such as health care services for medically needy, medically indigent persons and low
income children, education for the prevention and reduction of tobacco use and tobacco related disease and
addiction research.
B. It is the intention and desire of the people of Arizona in enacting this measure by initiative that the funds provided
hereby are in addition to and separate from other funds that are now and shall be annually appropriated by the
legislature. The funds provided hereby shall not be deemed or classed to be appropriations by the legislature.
Sec. 2. Title 42, Chapter 7, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended by adding Article 1.2 to read: 
ARTICLE 1.2 TOBACCO TAX FOR HEALTH CARE PURPOSES
42-1241. Levy and collection of tax; establishment of fund and accounts; purposes; administration; distribution
A. IN ADDITION TO ALL OTHER TAXES, AND IN ADDITION TO THE TAX LEVIED AND IMPOSED BY SECTIONS 42-1204 AND
42-1231, THERE IS LEVIED AND SHALL BE COLLECTED BY THE DEPARTMENT AND PAID TO THE STATE TREASURER IN THE
MANNER PROVIDED BY ARTICLE 1 OF THIS CHAPTER ON ALL CIGARETTES, CIGARS, SMOKING TOBACCO, PLUG
TOBACCO, SNUFF AND OTHER FORMS OF TOBACCO THE FOLLOWING TAX:
1. ON EACH CIGARETTE, 2 CENTS.
2. ON SMOKING TOBACCO, SNUFF, FINE CUT CHEWING TOBACCO, CUT AND GRANULATED TOBACCO, SHORTS
AND REFUSE OF FINE CUT CHEWING TOBACCO, AND REFUSE, SCRAPS, CLIPPINGS, CUTTINGS AND SWEEPINGS OF
TOBACCO, EXCLUDING TOBACCO POWDER OR TOBACCO PRODUCTS USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR AGRICULTURAL OR
HORTICULTURAL PURPOSES AND UNFIT FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION, 4.5 CENTS PER OUNCE OR MAJOR
FRACTION THEREOF.
TEXT OF PROPOSITION 200
APPENDIX C-2
3. ON ALL CAVENDISH, PLUG OR TWIST TOBACCO, 1.1 CENTS PER OUNCE OR FRACTIONAL PART THEREOF.
4. ON EACH TWENTY SMALL CIGARS OR FRACTIONAL PART THEREOF WEIGHING NOT MORE THAN THREE POUNDS
PER THOUSAND, 8.9 CENTS.
5. ON CIGARS OF ALL DESCRIPTIONS EXCEPT THOSE INCLUDED IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF THIS SUBSECTION, MADE OF
TOBACCO OR ANY SUBSTITUTE THEREFOR, IF MANUFACTURED TO RETAIL AT NOT MORE THAN 5 CENTS EACH, 4.4
CENTS ON EACH THREE CIGARS, BUT IF MANUFACTURED TO RETAIL AT MORE THAN 5 CENTS EACH, 4.4 CENTS ON
EACH CIGAR.
B. THE TOBACCO TAX AND HEALTH CARE FUND IS ESTABLISHED IN THE STATE TREASURY. THE FUND SHALL CONSIST OF
ALL REVENUES DEPOSITED THEREIN PURSUANT TO THIS ARTICLE AND ARTICLE 1.3 AND INTEREST EARNED ON THOSE
MONIES. THE STATE TREASURER SHALL DEPOSIT ALL MONIES RECEIVED UNDER THIS SECTION INTO THIS FUND. THE
STATE TREASURER SHALL INVEST MONIES IN THE FUND AND ALL ACCOUNTS THEREIN AS PROVIDED BY SECTION 35-311.
THE STATE TREASURER SHALL CREDIT MONIES EARNED FROM THESE INVESTMENTS TO THE FUND.
C. THE FUND SHALL BE DEPOSITED IN FOUR SEPARATE ACCOUNTS AND SHALL BE ADMINISTERED AS SET FORTH BELOW
FOR THE FOLLOWING PURPOSES, SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 42-1242:
1. TWENTY-THREE CENTS OF EACH DOLLAR IN THE FUND SHALL BE DEPOSITED IN THE HEALTH EDUCATION
ACCOUNT FOR PROGRAMS FOR THE PREVENTION AND REDUCTION OF TOBACCO USE, THROUGH PUBLIC HEALTH
EDUCATION PROGRAMS, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, COMMUNITY BASED EDUCATION, CESSATION,
EVALUATION AND OTHER PROGRAMS TO DISCOURAGE TOBACCO USE AMONG THE GENERAL POPULATION AS
WELL AS MINORS AND CULTURALLY DIVERSE POPULATIONS. THE ACCOUNT SHALL BE ADMINISTERED BY THE
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES.
2. FIVE CENTS OF EACH DOLLAR IN THE FUND SHALL BE DEPOSITED IN THE HEALTH RESEARCH ACCOUNT FOR
RESEARCH ON THE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF TOBACCO-RELATED DISEASE AND ADDICTION. THE
ACCOUNT SHALL BE ADMINISTERED BY THE ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES.
3. SEVENTY CENTS OF EACH DOLLAR SHALL BE DEPOSITED IN THE MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT, FOR PROVIDING
PERSONS DETERMINED MEDICALLY INDIGENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 11.297, MEDICALLY NEEDY PURSUANT TO
SECTION 36-2905 OR LOW INCOME CHILDREN PURSUANT TO SECTION 36-2905.03, WITH HEALTH CARE SERVICES
PROVIDED BY THE ARIZONA HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT SYSTEM, PURSUANT TO TITLE 36, CHAPTER 29,
ARTICLE 1, OR ANY EXPANSION OF THAT PROGRAM, OR ANY SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT OR EXPANDED
SUCCESSOR PROGRAM ESTABLISHED BY THE LEGISLATURE PROVIDING HEALTH CARE SERVICES TO PERSONS WHO
CANNOT AFFORD THOSE SERVICES AND FOR WHOM THERE WOULD OTHERWISE BE NO COVERAGE. THESE
SERVICES SHALL INCLUDE, BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO, PREVENTIVE CARE AND THE TREATMENT OF CATASTROPHIC
ILLNESS OR INJURY, AS PROVIDED BY THE ARIZONA HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT SYSTEM. THE ACCOUNT
SHALL BE ADMINISTERED BY THE ARIZONA HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION OR ANY
SUCCESSOR THERETO.
4. TWO CENTS OF EACH DOLLAR IN THE FUND SHALL BE DEPOSITED IN THE ADJUSTMENT ACCOUNT FOR TRANSFER
OF APPROPRIATE AMOUNTS TO THE CORRECTIONS FUND ESTABLISHED BY SECTION 41-1641 TO COMPENSATE
FOR DECREASES IN THE CORRECTIONS FUND RESULTING FROM LOWER TOBACCO TAX REVENUES AVAILABLE
UNDER SECTION 42-1204, SUBSECTION B, PARAGRAPH 3 AS A RESULT OF THE TAX SET FORTH IN SECTION 
42-1241. ANY FUNDS IN THE ADJUSTMENT ACCOUNT IN EXCESS OF THE AMOUNT NEEDED FOR SUCH
ADJUSTMENT SHALL REVERT TO THE TOBACCO TAX AND HEALTH CARE FUND FOR DISTRIBUTION IN EQUAL
PROPORTIONS TO THE ACCOUNTS DESCRIBED UNDER SUBSECTION C, PARAGRAPHS 1, 2 AND 3 OF THIS SECTION.
THE FUNDS DEPOSITED IN THE ADJUSTMENT ACCOUNT UNDER THIS PROVISION SHALL BE ADMINISTERED BY THE
DEPARTMENT.
D. THE FUND AND ITS ACCOUNTS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION. EXPENDITURES FROM EACH ACCOUNT ARE NOT
SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL APPROVAL, NOTWITHSTANDING ANY STATUTORY PROVISION TO THE CONTRARY.
E. IN NO EVENT SHALL ANY MONIES IN THE FUND OR ITS ACCOUNTS REVERT TO THE STATE GENERAL FUND. MONIES IN
THE FUND AND ITS ACCOUNTS ARE EXEMPT FROM THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 35-190, RELATING TO LAPSING OF
APPROPRIATIONS.
F. UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THIS ARTICLE IS VESTED IN AND SHALL BE EXERCISED BY THE
DEPARTMENT ACCORDING TO CHAPTER 1, ARTICLES 1 AND 2 OF THIS TITLE, ARTICLE 1 OF THIS CHAPTER AND THIS
ARTICLE.
42-1242. Use of funds
MONIES IN THE FUND SHALL BE EXPENDED ONLY FOR PURPOSES AUTHORIZED BY THIS ARTICLE. MONIES DEPOSITED 
IN THE HEALTH EDUCATION AND HEALTH RESEARCH ACCOUNTS SHALL ONLY BE USED TO SUPPLEMENT FUNDS
APPROPRIATED BY THE LEGISLATURE FOR HEALTH EDUCATION AND HEALTH RESEARCH PURPOSES AND SHALL NOT BE USED
TO SUPPLANT SUCH APPROPRIATED FUNDS. MONIES DEPOSITED IN THE MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT SHALL ONLY BE
USED TO SUPPLEMENT FUNDS APPROPRIATED BY THE LEGISLATURE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING LEVELS OF SERVICE
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO TITLE 36, CHAPTER 29, ARTICLE 1 TO ELIGIBLE PERSONS AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 
36-2901, PARAGRAPH 4, OR ANY EXPANSION OF SUCH LEVELS OF SERVICE, OR ANY SUCCESSOR PROGRAM ESTABLISHED 
BY THE LEGISLATURE PROVIDING LEVELS OF SERVICE SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT TO OR EXPANDING THOSE PROVIDED,
PURSUANT TO TITLE 36, CHAPTER 29, ARTICLE 1 TO SUCH ELIGIBLE PERSONS. MONIES DEPOSITED IN THE MEDICALLY
NEEDY ACCOUNT SHALL NOT BE USED TO SUPPLANT FUNDS APPROPRIATED BY THE LEGISLATURE FOR THE PURPOSE OF
PROVIDING LEVELS OF SERVICE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO TITLE 36, CHAPTER 29, ARTICLE 1. FOR PURPOSES OF THIS
SECTION, ”LEVELS OF SERVICE” MEANS THE PROVIDER PAYMENT METHODOLOGY, ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA AND COVERED
SERVICES ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO TITLE 36, CHAPTER 29, ARTICLE 1 IN EFFECT ON JULY 1, 1993.
Sec. 3. Title 42, Chapter 7, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended by adding Article 1.3, to read:
ARTICLE 1.3. INDIAN RESERVATION TOBACCO TAX
42-1251. Definitions
IN THIS ARTICLE, UNLESS THE CONTEXT OTHERWISE REQUIRES:
1. “INDIAN” MEANS ANY PERSON DULY REGISTERED ON THE TRIBAL ROLLS OF AN INDIAN TRIBE OCCUPYING AN
INDIAN RESERVATION.
2. “INDIAN RESERVATION” MEANS ALL LANDS HELD IN TRUST BY THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF AREAS
SET ASIDE BY THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EXCLUSIVE USE AND OCCUPANCY OF INDIAN TRIBES BY TREATY,
STATUTE OR EXECUTIVE ORDER WHICH AREAS ARE RECOGNIZED AS INDIAN RESERVATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR.
3. “INDIAN TRIBE” MEANS ANY ORGANIZED INDIAN NATION, TRIBE, BAND OR COMMUNITY RECOGNIZED AS AN
INDIAN TRIBE BY THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR.
42-1252. Levy of Indian Reservation tobacco tax; rate; distribution of revenues; civil penalty; exemptions
A. IN ADDITION TO ALL OTHER TAXES, THERE IS LEVIED AND SHALL BE COLLECTED BY THE DEPARTMENT AND PAID TO THE
STATE TREASURER A TAX ON THE PURCHASE ON AN INDIAN RESERVATION OF CIGARETTES, CIGARS, SMOKING
TOBACCO, PLUG TOBACCO, SNUFF AND OTHER FORMS OF TOBACCO, AT THE RATES PRESCRIBED BY SECTION 42-1241,
SUBSECTION A.
B. THE TAXES LEVIED AND COLLECTED PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION A OF THIS SECTION SHALL BE DEPOSITED IN THE
TOBACCO TAX AND HEALTH CARE FUND ESTABLISHED BY SECTION 42-1241 AND USED FOR THE PURPOSES PROVIDED
THEREIN.
C. THE TAXES LEVIED PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION ARE CONCLUSIVELY PRESUMED TO BE DIRECT TAXES ON THE
CONSUMER BUT SHALL BE PRECOLLECTED AND REMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT BY THE DISTRIBUTOR FOR THE
PURPOSE OF CONVENIENCE AND FACILITY ONLY. THE TAXES THAT ARE PRECOLLECTED AND PAID TO THE DEPARTMENT
BY THE DISTRIBUTOR SHALL BE CONSIDERED TO BE AN ADVANCE PAYMENT AND SHALL BE ADDED TO THE PRICE OF
THE CIGARETTES, CIGARS, SMOKING TOBACCO, PLUG TOBACCO, SNUFF AND OTHER FORMS OF TOBACCO AND SHALL
BE RECOVERED FROM THE CONSUMER.
D. IF THE TAX IMPOSED BY THIS SECTION ON CIGARETTES, CIGARS, SMOKING TOBACCO, PLUG TOBACCO, SNUFF AND
OTHER FORMS OF TOBACCO HAS NOT BEEN PRECOLLECTED OR REMITTED WHEN DUE BY THE DISTRIBUTOR, THE
DISTRIBUTOR SHALL BE SUBJECT TO A CIVIL PENALTY EQUAL TO THE AMOUNT OF TAXES THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
PRECOLLECTED OR REMITTED BUT WAS NOT.
E. THE TAX LEVIED BY THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY TO CIGARETTES, CIGARS, SMOKING TOBACCO, PLUG TOBACCO,
SNUFF AND OTHER FORMS OF TOBACCO:
1. FOR WHICH THE TAXES IMPOSED BY ARTICLE 1.2 OF THIS CHAPTER HAVE BEEN PAID.
2. SOLD BY AN INDIAN TRIBE, OR BY A FEDERALLY LICENSED INDIAN TRADER, ON AN INDIAN RESERVATION TO INDIANS
WHO ARE ENROLLED MEMBERS OF THE INDIAN TRIBE FOR WHOSE BENEFIT THE INDIAN RESERVATION WAS
ESTABLISHED.
42-1253. Precollection and remittance of tax by purchase of revenue stamps; procedure for claiming exemption
A. FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE PRECOLLECTION AND REMITTANCE OF THE TAX IMPOSED BY SECTION 42-1252 ON
CIGARETTES, CIGARS, SMOKING TOBACCO, PLUG TOBACCO, SNUFF AND OTHER FORMS OF TOBACCO, THE
DISTRIBUTORS SHALL PURCHASE AND AFFIX REVENUE STAMPS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 1 OF THIS CHAPTER.
B. THE DEPARTMENT SHALL PROMULGATE REGULATIONS PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES FOR CLAIMING AND VERIFYING
SALES EXEMPT UNDER SECTION 42-1252, SUBSECTION E.
42-1254. Criminal violation; classification
A DISTRIBUTOR OR ANY PERSON WHO SHIPS, TRANSPORTS, SELLS OR DISTRIBUTES CIGARETTES, CIGARS, SMOKING
TOBACCO, PLUG TOBACCO, SNUFF AND OTHER FORMS OF TOBACCO ON WHICH THE TAX REQUIRED BY THIS
ARTICLE HAS NOT BEEN PAID IS GUILTY OF A CLASS 3 MISDEMEANOR.
APPENDIX C-3
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42-1255. Administration
UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THIS ARTICLE IS VESTED IN AND SHALL BE EXERCISED BY
THE DEPARTMENT ACCORDING TO CHAPTER 1, ARTICLES 1 AND 2 OF THIS TITLE, ARTICLE 1 OF THIS CHAPTER AND
THIS ARTICLE.
42-1256. Preemption by state
THE AREA OF INDIAN RESERVATION TOBACCO TAXATION IS PREEMPTED BY THIS STATE, AND A COUNTY, CITY, TOWN
OR OTHER POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THIS STATE SHALL NOT LEVY SUCH A TAX. NOTHING IN THIS SECTION SHALL
PRECLUDE AN INDIAN TRIBE FROM IMPOSING ITS OWN TOBACCO TAX OR SIMILAR LEVY.
42-1257. Indian reservation tobacco tax not to apply if similar tax is imposed by Indian tribe
IF AN INDIAN TRIBE IMPOSES A LUXURY, SALES, TRANSACTION PRIVILEGE OR SIMILAR TAX ON CIGARETTES, CIGARS,
SMOKING TOBACCO, PLUG TOBACCO, SNUFF AND OTHER FORMS OF TOBACCO, BUT AT A RATE LESS THAN THAT
PRESCRIBED BY SECTION 42-1252, SUBSECTION A, THE TAX IMPOSED BY SECTION 42-1252, SUBSECTION A SHALL BE
LEVIED AT A RATE EQUAL TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE RATE PRESCRIBED BY SECTION 42-1252, SUBSECTION A
AND THE TAX IMPOSED BY SUCH INDIAN TRIBE. IF THE TAX IMPOSED BY SUCH INDIAN TRIBE IS EQUAL TO OR
GREATER THAN THE TAX PRESCRIBED BY SECTION 42-1252, SUBSECTION A, THEN THE RATE PRESCRIBED BY SECTION
42-1252, SUBSECTION A SHALL BE ZERO.
Sec. 4. Severability clause
If any provision of this measure is declared invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, such invalidity does not
affect other provisions that can be given effect without the invalid provision and to this end the provisions of this
measure are declared to be severable.
ANALYSIS BY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
(In compliance with A.R.S. section 19-124)
Proposition 200 proposes to increase the state tax on cigarettes, cigars, and other tobacco products and use the additional
revenue generated for health care and for education and research related to preventing and reducing tobacco use. The
following table shows the proposed tax rates on each class of tobacco product:
APPENDIX C-4
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PROPOSED PROPOSED
CURRENT ADDITIONAL TOTAL
ITEM TAX RATE TAX RATE TAX RATE
Cigarettes .9 cents each 2 cents each 2.9 cents each
(18 cents per pack) (40 cents per pack) (58 cents per pack)
Smoking tobacco, snuff, fine cut chewing tobacco, 2 cents per oz. 4.5 cents per oz. 6.5 cents per oz.
cut and granulated tobacco, shorts and refuse of
fine cut chewing tobacco, and refuse, scraps, 
clippings, cuttings and sweepings of tobacco
(except tobacco powder and tobacco products
used exclusively for agricultural purposes and
unfit for human consumption)
Cavendish, plug or twist tobacco .5 cents per oz. 1.1 cents per oz. 1.6 cents per oz.
APPENDIX D-1
TOBACCO TAX-RELATED LEGISLATION IN ARIZONA, 1995-99
1995: 42nd Legislature, First Regular Session, Third Special Session
MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT
 An “amount necessary” to pay the state share for persons eligible for heart, liver,
lung, heart-lung or bone marrow transplants.
 $1.25 milion monthly, beginning August 1, 1995, to the Medically Needy and
Indigent Stabilization Fund within Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System
(AHCCCS), to be used to offset the cost of providing levels of services to persons
determined medically indigent, medically needy, or low-income children.
 Up to $15 million annually to the Arizona Department of Health Services (ADHS), 
as follows:
• Up to $5 million, but not less than 33% of the total amount transferred, for the
mental health program;
• Up to $5 million, but not less than 33% of the total amount for primary care 
services; and
• Up to $5 million, but not less than 33% of the total amount for grants to 
community health centers.
 Up to $500,000 annually to ADHS during FY96 and FY97 for pilot programs for
detoxification services.
 Up to $250,000 annually to ADHS during FY96, FY97, and FY98 for telemedicine
pilot programs.
Also:
 An “amount necessary” to reimburse ADHS for administrative costs, not to exceed 
2% of the transferred amount for each program, and an “amount necessary” for the
required evaluation.
HEALTH EDUCATION ACCOUNT
Up to $10 million in FY96, and up to $20 million in FY97 and each year thereafter (but
not more than 90% of the prior fiscal year’s Tobacco Tax and Health Care Fund’s 
allocation) to ADHS for:
 Contracts with county health departments, qualifying community health centers
Indian tribes, accredited schools, community colleges and universities for education
programs related to the prevention and reduction of tobacco use;
 Related administrative expenditures for overseeing these contracts; and,
 ADHS expenditures for development and delivery of education programs designed
to prevent or reduce tobacco use including radio, television, or print media costs.
Further, ADHS may spend 95% of the balance of this account as of October 1, 1997
over at least three fiscal years beginning in SFY98.
HEALTH RESEARCH ACCOUNT
Authorization for the Arizona Disease Control Research Commission to spend in FY95-96,
from the monies contained in this account, up to 80% of the monies available through
June 30, 1995 for research on the prevention and treatment of tobacco related diseases
and addiction and for expenses incurred by the Commission in administering the health
research program. Expenditures from the fund in subsequent fiscal years subject to the
availability of funds.
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ADJUSTMENT ACCOUNT
No legislative changes
TOBACCO TAX-RELATED LEGISLATION IN ARIZONA, 1995-99
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1996: 42nd Legislature, Second Regular Session
MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT
Technical amendment regarding the transfer of $15 million to
ADHS, as follows:
 On-third of the total for the mental health grant program;
 One-third of the total for primary care services; and,
 One-third of the total for grants to community health 
centers.
In addition, the following new allocations:
 Up to $150,000 annually to ADHS beginning in FY97 
for end stage renal disease contracts with nonprofit 
organizations;
 Up to $20 million annually beginning in FY97 through FY99
(plus an amount equal to 2% of the funds transferred for
administrative costs) into the Premium Sharing
Demonstration Project Fund, which is established by a
transfer of funds from the Medically Needy Account, begin-
ning on October 1, 1997. To be administered as a continu-
ing expenditure. In addition, $75,000 for administrative
start-up funds.
 Up to $5 million annually beginning in FY97 to ADHS for
basic children’s medical services;
 $10 million in FY97 for the discount on private hospital
reimbursement;
 $4,522,800 in FY97 to continue the scheduled phase-out
of the quick payment discount; and,
 $2,021,200 to replace federal funds reduced due to the
lower matching assistance percentage for federal FY97.
Medical Services Stabilization Fund
 Change the name from the Medically Needy and Indigent
Stabilization Fund to Medical Services Stabilization Fund.
 Eliminate the requirement that funds could only be used for
“unanticipated” increases in the cost of providing levels of
services to the designated population, thus expanding it to
be used for any type of increases.
 Further expand the use of the funds to offset increases in
the cost of providing levels of service if the increase results
from a decrease in federal funding, including match rate
decreases.
HEALTH EDUCATION ACCOUNT
No legislative changes
HEALTH RESEARCH ACCOUNT
No legislative changes
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
ADJUSTMENT ACCOUNT
No legislative changes
1997: 43rd Legislature, First Regular and First Special Sessions
MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT
 $200,000 increase to ADHS, beginning in FY99, for 
contracts with hospitals that perform non-renal organ 
transplants.
 $7.5 million to ADHS for public health education.
 Increase from $150,000 to $250,000 annually, the amount
transferred to ADHS for contracts related to end-stage
renal disease.
 $1 million to the Health Crisis Fund (established by
Executive Order).
 Increase from $5 million to $6 million annually for primary
care programs.
 $500,000 to extend the detoxification pilot for one 
additional year.
 $500,000 to Arizona Department of Economic Security
(ADES) for services to persons meeting the low-income 
eligibility criteria of the Aging and Adult Administration.
 $2.5 million to ADHS for capital projects in FY98 and FY99
to entities providing health services in rural areas or under-
served areas.
 Increase the amount allowable transferred for DHS 
administrative costs from two percent to four percent.
 $111,200 to ADHS to implement Rural Private Primary
Care Provider Loan Repayment Program.
 $65,000 to ADHS for primary care services in Salome,
Arizona.
 $14.8 million from the balance remaining at the end of
FY97 to the ADHS Construction Services Account.
 $ for Maternity Length of Stay
 $ for HIV/AIDS Treatment
Premium Sharing Demonstration Program:
Allocate two percent of funds for administrative costs.
HEALTH EDUCATION ACCOUNT
Increase the expenditure limit from $15 million to $25 million
and limit the expenditures to 90% of the previous year’s 
revenue allocation. After a FY98 estimate is made, allow 95%
of the remaining balance to be spent over the next three 
fiscal years.
HEALTH RESEARCH ACCOUNT
No legislative changes
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
ADJUSTMENT ACCOUNT
No legislative changes
TOBACCO TAX-RELATED LEGISLATION IN ARIZONA, 1995-99
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1998: 43rd Legislature, First Regular and Fourth Special Sessions
MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT
 $9,251,100 in FY99 to the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program, which will consist of these funds plus
$29,148,900 in federal funds (for a total of $38.4 million).
Program to be administered by AHCCCS.
 $5 million in FY99 to ADHS for grants to contracting quali-
fying health centers and $3 million for grants to contracting
hospitals related to the State Children’s Health Insurance
Program.
 Decrease from $5 million to $2.5 million in FY99 for the
ADHS Basic Children’s Medical Services Program. Funding
is eliminated in FY00.
 Repeal of $14.8 million to ADHS for construction of a
health laboratory.
Medical Services Stabilization Fund:
 Discontinue the $1.25 monthly deposit to the Medical
Services Stabilization Fund after July 1, 1999.
 $8 million from Medical Services Stabilization Fund in FY99
to provide reinsurance to Healthcare Group health plans.
HEALTH EDUCATION ACCOUNT
At least $550,000 to ADHS, beginning in FY99, to implement
a pilot program for anti-smoking advertising on school
buses.
HEALTH RESEARCH ACCOUNT
$5 million in FY99, $2 million in FY00 and FY01, and $1 
million in FY02 for Disease Control Research Commission.
The $10 million (total) is for the support of cancer research
projects at all phases of drug discovery, application, develop-
ment, and clinical trials.
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
ADJUSTMENT ACCOUNT
No legislative change
1999: 43rd Legislature, Second Regular Session
MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT
 $250,000 in FY00 to extend the telemedicine pilot 
program.
 $2.5 million to extend Primary Care Capital Construction.
 $500,000 to extend detoxification services.
 $95,000 to ADHS in FY00 for the provision of primary care
services through an existing community health center
located in a rural, medically underserved area of a county.
 $280,000 to ADHS in FY00 for immunization services and
outreach.
 $661,800 to ADHS in FY00 and $624,500 in FY01 for the
immunization information system and associated 
operating costs.
 $350,000 to ADHS in both FY00 and FY01 for Hepatitus C
education.
 $119,000 to ADHS in FY00 for asthma program.
 $450,000 to ADHS in both FT00 and FY01 for an 
osteoporosis prevention and treatment education 
program.
 $670,000 to ADHS from FY00 through FY03 for state match
funds for the federal Title V abstinence only education
program.
 $150,000 to ADHS in both FY00 and FY01 for epidemi-
ology programs.
 $14,000 to ADHS in both FY00 and FY01 for public health
information.
HEALTH EDUCATION ACCOUNT
No legislative change
HEALTH RESEARCH ACCOUNT
No legislative change
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
ADJUSTMENT ACCOUNT
No legislative change
1 Information and data retrieved by Cannon & Gill; compiled and presented by Morrison Institute for Public Policy.
MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS1
Program name ORGAN TRANSPLANTS
(AZ Revised (ARS 36-2921)
Statutes)
Brief A program administered by AHCCCS that pays
description for the state share of costs for providing health 
care services to persons who become eligible 
for a heart, lung, heart-lung, liver or autolo-
gous and allogenic bone marrow transplant as 
determined by the administrator.
Year created 1995
Year funding FY95
began
Admin % Not tracked
Number of Four contracted transplant facilities and 
contractors/ Five non-contracted facilities
programs
Population AHCCCS eligible transplant patients
served (highly indicated)
Eligibility AHCCCS covers the following medically needy 
requirements transplantation services, and related immuno-
suppressant drugs: bone marrow/stem cell, 
heart; lung and heart-lung; kidney; liver; and 
medically necessary services for members who 
receive transplants that are not covered by 
AHCCCS. The policies for each of the above 
transplantation services vary depending on the 
service. Transplantation services are not cov-
ered for non-categorically eligible members 
during prior period coverage except for those 
persons pursuant to Laws 1995, Ch. 1.
ARS data None
reporting or
evaluation
requirements
Other data The agency reports on the number of Title XIX 
collection or approved and waiting by fiscal year and by 
evaluation type; the number of MN/MI approved and 
conducted waiting and by type; the number of Title XIX 
completed transplants by fiscal year and type; 
and the number of MN/MI completed trans-
plants by fiscal year and type.
Title XIX Completed by Type (total, all years)
Total Heart+Lung = 2
Total Lung = 2
MN/MI Completed by Type (total, all years)
Total Heart = 5
Total Liver = 6
Total Bone Marrow = 36
Total Heart+Lung = 0
Total Lung = 1
In addition, an on-site visit is conducted for 
each facility prior to contracting.
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Program name PRIMARY CARE PROGRAMS, PART A
(AZ Revised (ARS 36-2921, 36-2907.5)
Statutes)
Brief Established community-based primary care
description programs to provide comprehensive primary
care services to indigent or uninsured Arizona
residents. Specifically, funds are intended to 
develop contractors’ capacity to provide 
medical care through employment of 
physicians, nurses, physician assistants or 
other health care personnel.
Year created 1995
Year funding FY96
began
Admin % Initially 2%, changed to 4%
Number of Information not available
contractors/
programs
Population Uninsured low-income, at-risk individuals in
served identified communities (selected)
Eligibility • Arizona resident, and
requirements • Uninsured & ineligible for AHCCCS &
Medicare, and
• Income less than 200% federal poverty level 
(FPL)
ARS data An annual program evaluation must be
reporting or performed to examine the effectiveness and
evaluation efficiency of the programs. It must include, but
requirements is not limited to the following information:
• Level and scope of services offered
• Types of services offered
• Frequency of services offered
• Personal characteristics of the program 
participants who receive services
• Demographic characterisitics of the program 
participants who receive services
• Number of program participants
• Information on program contractors and 
providers
• Program revenues and expenditures
• Average cost per participant
• Average cost of providing each service
• Administrative costs for each program
• Methods for selecting eligible contractors
• Estimate of the benefits and effects of 
providing health care to persons who cannot 
get it or would otherwise be ineligible
The annual report must be submitted no later 
than November 1 of each year and ADHS 
shall receive funds annually to perform the 
evaluation.
Other data None
collection or
evaluation
conducted
APPENDIX E-2
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Program name TELEMEDICINE
(AZ Revised (ARS 36-2921.5, 36-2352)
Statutes)
Brief A pilot program designed to facilitate the
description provision of medical services to persons living
in underserved areas through the use of 
telecommunication between the urban and 
rural communities. Contractor focus is 
psychiatric services.
Year created 1995
Year funding FY96
began
Admin % Initially 2%, changed to 4%
Number of Two contractors
contractors/
programs
Population Low-income, indigent, and/or uninsured
served persons in targeted communities 
(highly indicated)
Eligibility Selected pilot recipients determined by 
requirements contractor
ARS data Same as Primary Care Programs
reporting or
evaluation
requirements
Other data None 
collection or
evaluation
conducted
Program name QUALIFYING COMMUNITY HEALTH 
(AZ Revised CENTERS, PART B
Statutes) (ARS 36-2921, 36-2907.06)
Brief Provides primary health care services to
description indigent or uninsured Arizona residents 
through qualifying community health centers 
in Arizona’s Medically-Underserved Areas 
(AzMUA). Funding is for development and 
maintenance of an enhanced statewide 
capacity for cost-effective delivery of services 
to persons of all ages.
Year created 1995
Year funding FY96
began
Admin % Initially 2%, changed to 4%
Number of Nine evaluation contractors;
contractors/ process and demographic information
programs
Population Indigent and uninsured Arizona residents
served (selected)
Eligibility • Arizona resident, and
requirements • Uninsured and ineligible for AHCCCS & 
Medicare, and
• Annual income of less than 200% of federal 
poverty level (FPL)
ARS data Same as Primary Care Programs
reporting or
evaluation
requirements
Other data None
collection or
evaluation
conducted
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Program name MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAMS FOR
(AZ Revised NON-TITLE XIX
Statutes) (ARS 36-3414, 36-2921)
Brief Each Regional Behavioral Health Authority 
description (RBHA) developed a different set of services
focused in five major areas:
• Psychiatric crisis response systems
• Programs for youth
• Mental health support services for 
SMI persons
• Mental health support services for 
elderly persons
• Rural detoxification
Year created 1995
Year funding FY96
began
Admin % Initially 2%, changed to 4%
Number of Five Regional Behavioral Health Authorities
contractors/ (RBHAs)
programs
Population Persons with mental illness and substance
served abuse problems (selected)
Eligibility Depends on program. There are over 20
requirements different programs administered by the five 
RBHAs using these funds and the detoxification
program funds combined.
ARS data Same as Primary Care Programs
reporting or
evaluation
requirements
Other data Same as Primary Care Programs
collection or
evaluation
conducted
Program name DETOXIFICATION SERVICES
(AZ Revised (ARS 36-2921.4)
Statutes)
Brief A pilot program designed to determine the
description appropriateness and effectiveness of having 
level II behavioral health facilities deliver 
detoxification treatment and services to 
indigent, or uninsured people who do not 
require the services of hospital or a level I 
behavioral health facility, and who do not 
require the use of restrictive behavior manage-
ment practices. The law specified that the pilot 
programs be implemented and operated:
• Only upon funding availability
• Only in counties having a population of 
500,000 persons or less
• In at least one county, but in no more than 
three
The legislature requires ADHS to give priority  
to those RBHAs responsible for delivering 
behavioral health services in areas where there 
is a high demand for detoxification services 
and a lack of facility beds to meet the demand. 
ADHS is required to also give priority to those
programs providing at least a 25 percent 
match.
Year created 1995
Year funding FY96
began
Admin % Initially 2%, changed to 4%
Number of Two of the five Regional Behavioral Health 
contractors/ Authorities (RBHAs) with services provided
programs in Page and Yuma
Population Persons with drug and alcohol addiction
served (selected)
Eligibility Over the age of 18
requirements
ARS data Same as Primary Care Programs. In addition,
reporting or per 42-1242.02 Sec.10, the pilots shall be
evaluation evaluated in a separate report to the Legislature.
requirements The report to the Legislature shall be a 
comprehensive assessment that covers the 
three years of the operation of the program.
Other data None
collection or
evaluation
conducted
Program name PREMIUM SHARING DEMONSTRATION
(AZ Revised PROJECT
Statutes) (ARS 36-2923, 36-2921)
Brief Establishes a fund to “provide uninsured
description persons access to medical services provided 
by system providers” by helping them pay the 
premium. The fund consists of monies trans-
ferred from the Medically Needy Account. 
AHCCCS withdrew the sum of $20,000,000 
during each of FY97, FY98, and FY99 to 
establish the fund. AHCCCS prepays capitated 
rates to the three health plans and collects 
premiums from household enrolling in the 
program.
Year created 1996
Year funding FY97
began
Admin % 2%
Number of Three: Arizona Physicians, University Physicians,
contractors/ Mercy Care
programs
Population Target population is the working poor, often
served referred to as the “notch” group. A secondary 
target population is the chronically ill. The 
project has been enrolling persons since 
February 1, 1998. The enrollment as of 
July 5, 1999 is 4,596. (highly indicated)
Eligibility For the working poor: income between
requirements 0-200% of the federal poverty level (FPL), 
without health insurance for at least six 
months, and an Arizona resident. 
For the chronically ill: income between 200-
400% of the FPL and receiving services 
through the Medically Needy Account for at 
least 12 months. 
All enrollees with income below 200% of the 
FPL may not pay more than 4% of their annual
income on premiums.
ARS data ARS 36-2921 and 36-2923
reporting or Requires that the Arizona Legislative Counsel
evaluation submit a report semiannually to the premium
requirements sharing demonstration oversight committee. 
The report must contain the following informa-
tion regarding the demonstration project:
• An analysis of client satisfaction
• Program enrollment information
• Average annual income of the enrollee
• Annual medical service expenditure
• Total monies collected from enrollees
• Information necessary to analyze and 
evaluate the project’s effectiveness or impact
A review of the actual medical costs incurred 
and the premiums shared.
Other data None
collection or
evaluation
conducted
Program name RENAL DISEASE MANAGEMENT
(AZ Revised (ARS 36-2921)
Statutes)
Brief ADHS contracts for end stage renal disease 
description treatment services were completely funded out 
of state general funds through SFY 1997. In 
1998, the State general funds for these con-
tractural services were supplemented with 
funding generated from the tobacco tax. The 
purpose is to provide end stage renal disease 
treatment to patients who are residents of the 
State of Arizona who do not have adequate 
financial resources to pay for the services and 
supplies that may be required for treatment, 
and who are ineligible for funds from other 
sources. The services include medications, 
necessary transportation, dental care, and 
nutritional supplements. The annual budget 
consists of $101,000 from the State general 
fund and $250,000 from tobacco tax funds. 
The cost of obtaining such services for ineligi-
ble clients is borne by the Arizona Kidney 
Foundation.
Year created 1996
Year funding FY97
began
Admin % 0%
Number of One contractor – Arizona Kidney Foundation
contractors/
programs
Population Persons with end stage renal disease
served (highly indicated)
Eligibility Arizona residency and lack of financial resource
requirements to pay for services and supplies
ARS data None
reporting or
evaluation
requirements
Other data No funding provided for evaluation. The 
collection or Arizona Kidney Foundation monitors the
evaluation number of clients that receive services and the
conducted cost per client per month. The number of 
clients receiving medication assistance, trans-
portation assistance, dental care services, and 
the nutritional supplement program is tracked 
each quarter, including the average cost per 
client per month by each individual service.
APPENDIX E-4
MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS
Program name BASIC CHILDREN’S MEDICAL SERVICES
(AZ Revised (ARS 36-2907.08)
Statutes)
Brief The program was created to provide grants to
description hospitals that exclusively serve the medical 
needs of children or that operate programs 
designed primarily for children. Provides 
specialized pediatric ambulatory and inpatient 
hospital services to eligible children through 
the age of 18. There are an estimated 4,500 
children with special health care needs and 
estimated 200,000 uninsured children in 
Arizona. The funds allocated for this program 
are intended to improve access to pediatric 
care for underinsured/uninsured children not 
eligible for AHCCCS. It was envisioned that the 
program would become a component of the 
delivery system that would efficiently and 
effectively deliver specialized outpatient and 
inpatient hospital services, while the other 
programs coordinated primary and follow-up 
care. The program’s goals relate to the larger 
health initiatives – Arizona 2000 Goal #2 – 
Universe access to health services.
Year created 1996
Year funding FY97
began
Admin % 4%
Number of Three contractors
contractors/
programs
Population Uninsured children 18 and under with
served specialized needs (selected)
Eligibility • 18 years of age or under
requirements • Resident of Arizona
• No health insurance coverage or 
underinsured
• Family income less than 200% of federal
poverty level (FPL)
ARS data Same as Primary Care Programs
reporting or
evaluation
requirements
Other data None 
collection or
evaluation
conducted
Program name HIV/AIDS TREATMENT
(AZ Revised Laws 1997, First Special Session, Chapter 5
Statutes)
Brief A supplemental capitation payment made to 
description AHCCCS health plans to augment the cost of 
serving eligible HIV/AIDS members
Year created 1997
Year funding FY98
began
Admin % 8%
Number of All 11 AHCCCS health plans plus the ALTCS 
contractors/ program contracts, including DES/DDD, can 
programs serve people in the program.
Population AHCCCS eligible members being treated by 
served the health plans for HIV/AIDS; AHCCCS pays a
supplemental payment to the health plans for
treating this population. (not segregated)
Eligibility The member must be receiving one of the
requirements approved protease inhibitors for at least 15
days in the given month, must be AHCCCS 
eligible through Title XIX, Title XXI, or state-
only, and be assigned to a health plan or 
program contractor.
ARS data None
reporting or
evaluation
requirements
Other data Audit reports from each of the individual
collection or health plans
evaluation
conducted
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APPENDIX E-6
Program name PUBLIC HEALTH EDUCATION
(AZ Revised (ADMINISTRATION AND PROGRAM)
Statutes) (ARS 42-1242.01)
Brief Several Programs, as follows:
description • Abstinence Only Education – $670,000 for 
state match to receive federal funding
• Immunization Outreach – $140,000 (one 
time for 6 months)
• ASIIS – $147,600 pass through to the 
Governor’s Division for Children (3 year 
program) of which $25,000 for postage to 
send out immunization cards from the 
Governor.
The remainder of the funds from this one-time
allocation are as follows:
• FY00-FT03
• Immunization Services (FY00)
• ASIIS (FY00-01)
• ASIIS Operational Costs (FY00-FY01)
• Hepatitis C (FY00-FY01)
• Osteoporosis Program (FY00-FY01)
• Asthma Program (FY00)
• Abstinence Education (FY00-FY03)
• Medically Under-served of Minority 
Populations in Arizona (FY00-FY01)
• Epidemiology Studies (FY00-FY01)
• Perinatal Substance Abuse (FY00-FY02)
Year created 1997
Year funding FY98
began
Admin % Percentage varies by individual program/
line item
Number of 13 contractors for Abstinence Education,
contractors/ including one evaluation contractor, and one
programs media campaign contractor
Population Abstinence Education: various
served (selected and universe)
Eligibility Families with incomes up to 150% of the
requirements federal poverty level (FPL) who are not 
Title XIX eligible. The income limit increases up
to 175% of FPL in FY00 and to 200% from 
FY01, going forward.
ARS data None
reporting or
evaluation
requirements
Other data The Abstinence Only Education Program
collection or is evaluated.
evaluation
conducted
Program name AGING AND ADULT ADMINISTRATION
(AZ Revised (ARS 36-2921)
Statutes)
Brief The legislation mandates the funds be used
description for services to persons who meet low-income 
eligibility criteria developed by the Aging and 
Adult Administration of Arizona Department of 
Economic Security (ADES). ADES, through a 
determination of unmet need, developed the 
services to be offered which include non-med-
ical home and community-based services, such 
as adaptive aids and devices, home repair/
adaptation/renovation, and emergency respite 
care and medically-related transportation for 
persons meeting low income eligibility criteria. 
ADES/A&AA made stipulations to the area 
agencies for the use of the funds:
• Funds cannot be used to supplant existing 
resources.
• Determination of medical need has to be 
established prior to provision of services 
regardless of the type of service.
• Maximum limitation of $125,000 per project
• Special emphasis must be placed on commu-
nity involvement in the development.
• Programs must be innovative, considered 
“pilots,” and funds applied for annually.
• Funds have to be case managed.
Year created 1997
Year funding FY98
began
Admin % Information not available
Number of Eight area agencies on aging
contractors/
programs
Population Persons determined eligible for specific services
served through an Area Agency on Aging
(highly indicated)
Eligibility Income of less than 300% of the Supplemental 
requirements Security Income (SSI) and a sliding fee scale for
those with income above SSI. Those with 
income less than 100% of SSI are not charged 
for service, but are encouraged to make a 
donation. Those with income exceeding 300% 
of SSI must pay the full cost of the service.
ARS data None
reporting or
evaluation
requirements
Other data A report is prepared by the Aging and Adult
collection or Administration in the Arizona Department of
evaluation Economic Security (ADES) for the purpose of 
conducted complying with the agreement between 
AHCCCS and ADES. The report is the Program 
and Administration Financial Report and 
includes detailed information about the 
program and the expenditures.
MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS
APPENDIX E-7
Program name CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM; KIDSCARE
(AZ Revised Statutes) (ARS 36-2982)
Brief description Beginning in FY99, legislation requires that $9,251,100 be transferred 
from the Medically Needy Account to the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program to be matched with $29,148,900 in federal funds. These monies 
are administered by AHCCCS with an additional $8,000,000 appropriated 
to DHS in FY1999 (see DHS KidsCare appropriation program description 
below). The program is commonly known as “KidsCare.” The federal 
balanced budget act of 1997 provides the new federal funding to states 
for families with incomes up to 200% of the federal poverty level.
Year created 1998
Year funding began FY99
Admin % 10% may be used for administration and outreach
Number of contractors/ Uses existing infrastructure and authorizes AHCCCS to expand existing 
programs contracts with health care plans and contract with state employees health 
plans. All 11 AHCCCS health plans, plus the ADHS clinics serve the children 
in the program.
Population served Low income uninsured children who are ineligible for Medicaid 
(highly indicated)
Eligibility requirements Family incomes up to 150% of the federal poverty level (FPL) who are not 
Title XIX eligible. Income limit increases to 175% of FPL in FY00 and to 
200% beginning in FY01, onward.
ARS data reporting or Beginning January 1, 2000, AHCCCS must report annually to the Governor, 
evaluation requirements President, Speaker of the House and Director of the Department of Library 
Archives and Public Records the following information:
• Number of children served
• State and federal expenditures for the program for the previous state 
fiscal year
• Comparison of expenditures for the previous fiscal year with the expected 
federal funding for the next year
• Whether federal funding will be sufficient for the next year to provide 
services at the current percentage of the federal poverty level
• Any recommendations for changes to the program
Also, a ten member joint legislative study committee on the integration of 
health care services to determine the feasibility of integrating the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program, Premium Sharing, and Proposition 203 is created 
in ARS 36-2995. A federal report to the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services “State Assessment and Report” must be submitted on January 1, 
2000, and annually thereafter. The elements assess the operation of the 
State plan, including the progress made in reducing the number of uncov-
ered low-income children.
A state evaluation must be filed with the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services on March 31, 2000 with prescribed federal data elements.
Performance goals and strategic objectives to the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services on January 1, 2000, and annually with prescribed data 
elements.
Other data collection or The federal reporting requirements contain an evaluation component 
evaluation conducted including process and outcome information on the effectiveness of 
the program.
MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS
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Program name CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM
(AZ Revised (KIDSCARE) DIRECT SERVICES
Statutes) (ARS 36-2982)
Brief In addition to the AHCCCS administered
description portion of KidsCare, the legislation appropriates
these funds to ADHS for direct services to be 
performed through grants to qualifying health 
centers.
Year created 1998
Year funding FY99
began
Admin % 10%
Number of Information not available
contractors/
programs
Population Low-income uninsured children who are
served ineligible for Medicaid (highly indicated)
Eligibility Families with incomes up to 150% of the
requirements federal poverty level (FPL) who are not 
Title XIX eligible. The income limit increases up
to 175% of FPL in FY00 and to 200% from 
FY01, going forward.
ARS data Beginning January 1, 2000, AHCCCS must 
reporting or report annually the following information:
evaluation • Number of children served
requirements • State and federal expenditures for the
program for the previous state fiscal year
• Comparison of expenditures for the previous
fiscal year with the expected federal funding 
for the next year
• Whether federal funding will be sufficient for 
the next year to provide services at the 
current percentage of the federal poverty 
level
• Any recommendations for changes to the 
program
Also establishes a ten member joint legislative 
study committee on the integration of health 
care services to determine the feasibility of 
integrating the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program, Premium Sharing, and 
Proposition 203.
Other data None
collection or
evaluation
conducted
Program name CHILDREN’S HEALTH CARE INSURANCE 
(AZ Revised PROGRAM (KIDSCARE) DIRECT HOSPITAL
Statutes) SERVICES
(ARS 36-2982)
Brief In addition to the AHCCCS administered
description portion of KidsCare, the legislation appropriates
these funds to DHS for grants to qualifying 
hospitals.
Year created 1998
Year funding FY99
began
Admin % 10%
Number of Information not available
contractors/
programs
Population Low-income uninsured children who are
served ineligible for Medicaid (highly indicated)
Eligibility Families with incomes up to 150% of the
requirements federal poverty level (FPL) who are not 
Title XIX eligible. The income limit increases up
to 175% of FPL in FY00 and to 200% from 
FY01, going forward.
ARS data Beginning January 1, 2000, AHCCCS must 
reporting or report annually the following information:
evaluation • Number of children served
requirements • State and federal expenditures for the
program for the previous state fiscal year
• Comparison of expenditures for the previous
fiscal year with the expected federal funding 
for the next year
• Whether federal funding will be sufficient for 
the next year to provide services at the 
current percentage of the federal poverty 
level
• Any recommendations for changes to the 
program
Also establishes a ten member joint legislative 
study committee on the integration of health 
care services to determine the feasibility of 
integrating the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program, Premium Sharing, and 
Proposition 203.
Other data None
collection or
evaluation
conducted
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Program name HIV/AIDS DRUG ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
(AZ Revised Laws 1998, Fourth Special Session, Chapter 5
Statutes)
Brief The Arizona Department of Health Services is
description responsible for the administration of the AIDS
Drug Assistance Program (ADAP). ADAP 
provides access to medications used to treat
and prevent the onset of related opportunistic 
infections for low-income individuals living with
HIV/AIDS. It is funded from three sources: Ryan
White CARE Act Titles I and II and state funding.
The medications are purchased under a whole-
sale license issued by the Arizona State Board 
of Pharmacy and ADHS purchases medications 
from a wholesaler, stores inventory and distrib-
utes the medications. The medications are sent 
directly to the health care provider or 
pharmacy. There are currently 22 drugs avail-
able on the ADAP formulary.
Year created 1998
Year funding FY99
began
Admin % 0%
Number of None
contractors/
programs
Population Low-income individuals with HIV/AIDS in need
served of medication (highly indicated)
Eligibility Must be HIV-infected and a resident of Arizona.
requirements Annual income must be below 200% of 
federal poverty level. Must be ineligible for 
AHCCCS and not have any other benefits that 
can pay for the medications. Must file an 
application for AHCCCS and have a denial 
letter. Must file an application for ADAP.
ARS data None
reporting or
evaluation
requirements
Other data None
collection or
evaluation
conducted
Program name NON-RENAL DISEASE MANAGEMENT
(AZ Revised (ARS 36-132, Subsection D and 36-2921)
Statutes)
Brief 1998 Legislation transfers $200,000 to ADHS 
description for contracts with hospitals licensed by ADHS 
that perform non-renal organ transplant opera-
tions (currently only University Medical Center 
performs non-renal organ transplants). 
Contracts do not include payments for trans-
portation to and from treatment facilities. 
Reimbursement is based on the average whole-
sale price, less 15%, plus a $6.00 dispensing 
fee, plus postage/shipping costs not to exceed 
$10.00.
Year created 1998
Year funding FY99
began
Admin % 4%
Number of One contractor – University Medical Center
contractors/
programs
Population Persons needing non-renal organ transplant
served operations and who need financial assistance 
with their medications (highly indicated)
Eligibility Non-renal, solid organ transplant recipients 
requirements who are Arizona residents and meet at least 
one of the following criteria:
• Medicare enrollees with exhausted 
prescription medication benefits
• Primary and/or secondary insurance enrollees
with exhausted or insufficient prescription 
medication benefits
• Individuals without insurance coverage who 
are ineligible for AHCCCS coverage
Individuals meeting at least one of these
criteria must also have completed a self-
reported financial screening that shows their 
monthly expenses, including transplant-related 
medications, exceed their current family 
income. Tobacco tax funds can only be used 
as a payer of last resort.
ARS data None
reporting or
evaluation
requirements
Other data None
collection or
evaluation
conducted
APPENDIX E-10
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Program name HEALTHCARE GROUP
(AZ Revised (AHCCCS Omnibus 1998)
Statutes)
Brief Healthcare Group is the registered name of a
description prepaid medical coverage program developed 
for small businesses with 50 or fewer employ-
ees and political subdivisions within the state. 
The purpose is to provide health care coverage 
for the working uninsured population. 
Healthcare Group is an entity within AHCCCS. 
In 1998, funds from the tobacco tax-created 
Medical Services Stabilization Fund were trans-
ferred to provide reinsurance to Healthcare 
Group health plans due to an increase in costs 
exceeding the amount in premiums received. 
The increase in cost appeared to be due to 
several factors, including changes in federal law
and actions by private insurance companies 
which resulted in the pool of Healthcare Group
participants containing fewer healthy members
and more members with pre-existing condi-
tions and high health care costs. To discourage 
the adverse selection, the legislation also 
changed the eligibility for small businesses to 
prevent businesses from only enrolling their 
less healthy full-time employees.
Year created 1998
Year funding FY99
began
Admin % Not applicable
Number of Arizona Physicians IPA, Southwest Catholic
contractors/ Health Network (Mercy Healthcare Group),
programs and University Physicians, Inc.
Population Enrollees in Healthcare Group; employees of 
served small businesses with less than 50 employees  
or Arizona political subdivisions with fewer than
50 employees. As of July, 1999, total enroll-
ment was 12,546. (highly indicated)
Eligibility Changed in 1998 to prevent businesses from
requirements enrolling less-healthy members. Small busi-
nesses or Arizona political subdivisions with 
fewer than five full-time employees who 
choose to enroll in Healthcare Group must now
enroll all employees, and companies with 
between six and 50 full-time employees must 
enroll 80% of employees.
ARS data None
reporting or
evaluation
requirements
Other data None
collection or
evaluation
conducted
Program name TOBACCO EDUCATION
(AZ Revised (Ars 42-1242)
Statutes)
Brief Media campaign intended to prevent youth
description and pregnant/postpartum women from 
smoking
Year created 1995
Year funding FY95
began
Admin % 4%
Number of Local Projects = 17 (15 counties plus 
contractors/ Scottsdale School District and Intertribal
programs Council)
Media Campaign = 2 contractors
Evaluation = 4 contracts
Miscellaneous = 7 contracts (museums, school 
bus ads, etc.)
Population Media campaign intended to prevent youth
served and pregnant/postpartum women from
smoking (universe)
Eligibility Because it is a media campaign, eligibility is
requirements not applicable.
ARS data ARS 42-1242 indicates that one of the 
reporting or purposes for the funds is for “evaluation and 
evaluation other programs to discourage tobacco use
requirements among the general populations.” There is no
specific statutory requirements related to the
elements of the evaluation, however.
Other data ADHS has contracted with the Behavioral
collection or Sciences Section of the Arizona Cancer Center
evaluation at the University of Arizona to conduct an 
conducted outcome and cost effectiveness evaluation of
its anti-tobacco use media campaign. The eval-
uation will include: random sample telephone 
surveys, an in-depth survey of youth in schools,
in-depth telephone interviews with pregnant 
and postpartum women, focus groups with 
youth, and a study of media campaign cost-
effectiveness.
APPENDIX E-11
MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT 
PROGRAMS NOT PROVIDING DIRECT CLIENT SERVICE
PROGRAM OR ALLOCATION BRIEF DESCRIPTION
Maternity Length of Stay To provide coverage for an extended maternity length-of-stay of no less than 
48 hours following a normal delivery or 96 hours following a cesarean 
section as required by law. This funding provided the additional funds 
needed for AHCCCS to comply with the law for AHCCCS eligible persons.
Offset Loss in Federal Funding To replace federal funds reduced due to the lower federal matching 
assistance percentage for federal fiscal years 1996-97 and 1997-98 as 
reported by the U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services.
Phase-Down of Quick Pay To continue the scheduled phase-out of the quick payment discount required
by Laws 1993, second special session, chapter 6, sections 27 and 29, as 
amended by Laws 1995, first special session, chapter 5, section 6 and 8.
$10 Million Hospital To discontinue the annual ten million dollar discount on private hospital 
Reimbursement reimbursement required by Laws 1993, second special session, chapter 6, 
section 39, as amended by Laws 1995, first special session, chapter 5, 
section 10.
AHCCCS Medical Services Established as a transfer from the medically needy and indigent stabilization 
Stabilization Fund fund within AHCCCS to be used to offset the cost of providing levels of 
services to persons determined medically indigent, medically needy, or low-
income children. Beginning on August 1, 1995 and on the first day of each 
month thereafter, $1,250,000 to be transferred into the fund. Legislation 
during the 1998 session ceased the transfer of dollars into this fund.
Salome Health Services A one-time appropriation awarded to Salome’s non-profit medical association
to provide services to residents in the Salome area during SFY 1998.
Rural Private Primary Care Created in 1997 as a complement to the existing loan repayment program.
Provider Loan Repay Programs It creates financial incentives to both recruit and retain primary care providers
in designated medically underserved areas and increases the availability of 
primary health care providers.
Primary Care Capital A transfer of funds to DHS for capital project grants to public and non-profit  
Construction Projects entities that provide health services in rural and/or medically underserved 
areas.
TOBACCO TAX MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT FUNDS – FY 1995
TOBACCO TAX MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT FUNDS – FY 1996
Total Funds Available: $128,405.8
Total Expenditures: $26,245
1 Telemedicine Project <0.5% $ 255.0
2 Detox Pilot Program <0.5% $ 500.0
3 Organ Transplants <1.0% $ 734.8
4 Mental Health 2.7% $ 3,489.8
5 Qualifying Community 
Health Centers 2.8% $ 3,600.0
6 Primary Care Programs 2.8% $ 3,600.0
7 Medical Stabilization Fund 11.0% $ 14,065.4
8 Unspent 79.5% $102,160.8
Expenditures in 000’s Source: JLBC
Total Funds Available: $39,174.1
Total Expenditures: $1,003
1 Organ Transplants 2.6% $ 1,003.0
2 Unspent 97.4% $ 38,171.1
Expenditures in 000’s Source: JLBC
1
2
123
4 5 6
7
8
APPENDIX F-1
TOBACCO TAX MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT FUNDS – FY 1997
Total Funds Available: $189,074.9
Total Expenditures: $99,482.3
1 Renal Disease Management <0.25% $ 150.0
2 Telemedicine Project <0.25% $ 255.0
3 Evaluations <0.25% $ 282.0
4 Detox Pilot Program <0.50% $ 500.0
5 Basic Children’s Medical 
Services <1.00% $ 1,429.6
6 Organ Transplants <1.00% $ 1,707.9
7 Offset Loss in Federal
Funding 1.00% $ 2,021.2
8 Primary Care Programs 2.20% $ 4,134.7
9 Qualifying Community 
Health Centers 2.30% $ 4,404.1
10 Phase-Down of Quick Pay 2.40% $ 4,522.8
11 Mental Health 2.60% $ 5,000.0
12 10 M Hospital 
Reimbursement 5.20% $ 10,000.0
13 Premium Sharing Fund 10.60% $ 20,075.0
14 Medical Stabilization Fund 23.80% $ 45,000.0
15 Unspent 48.00% $ 87,187.1
Expenditures in 000’s Source: JLBC
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TOBACCO TAX MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT FUNDS – FY 1998
Total Funds Available: $175,743.9
Total Expenditures: $88,191.1
1 Rural PCP Loan Repay 
Program <0.25% $ 16.1
2 Salome Health Services <0.25% $ 65.0
3 Primary Care Capital 
Construction <0.25% $ 136.2
4 Evaluations <0.25% $ 242.6
5 Renal Disease Management <0.25% $ 250.0
6 Telemedicine <0.25% $ 368.3
7 DES Aging and Adult
Administration <0.50% $ 500.0
8 Detoxification Services <0.50% $ 500.0
9 Public Health Education <1.00% $ 957.6
10 Health Crisis Fund <1.00% $ 1,000.0
11 HIV/AIDS Treatment <1.00% $ 1,223.9
12 Organ Transplants <1.00% $ 1,619.2
13 Maternity Length of Stay 1.10% $ 1,919.0
14 Basic Children’s Medical
Services 2.30% $ 4,086.3
15 Offset Loss in Federal
Funding 2.40% $ 4,145.0
16 Mental Health 2.90% $ 5,000.0
17 Primary Care Programs 3.40% $ 5,983.2
18 Qualifying Community 
Health Centers 3.90% $ 6,874.9
19 Phase-Down of Quick Pay 4.50% $ 7,978.8
20 $10 M Hospital
Reimbursement 5.70% $ 10,000.0
21 Medical Services 
Stabilization Fund 8.40% $ 15,000.0
22 Premium Sharing Project 11.60% $ 20,325.0
23 Unspent 49.80% $ 87,552.8
Expenditures in 000’s Source: JLBC
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TOBACCO TAX MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT FUNDS – FY 1999
Total Funds Available: $171,680.3
Total Expenditures: $82,469.7
1 Nonrenal Disease 
Management <0.25% $ 9.3
2 CHIP Direct Services <0.25% $ 31.7
3 Rural PCP Loan Repay
Program <0.25% $ 37.5
4 Telemedicine <0.25% $ 126.3
5 Renal Disease Management <0.25% $ 239.1
6 Evaluations <0.25% $ 298.4
7 DES Aging and Adult
Administration <0.50% $ 500.0
8 Detoxification Services <0.50% $ 513.6
9 DHS Health Crisis Fund <1.00% $ 862.8
10 HIV/AIDS Treatment <1.00% $ 1,025.8
11 Primary Care Capital
Construction <1.00% $ 1,356.2
12 HIV/AIDS Drug Assistance
Program (ADAP) 1.00% $ 1,698.1
13 Basic Children’s Medical
Services 1.30% $ 2,294.3
14 Organ Transplants 2.00% $ 3,500.0
15 Offset Loss in Federal
Funding 2.40% $ 4,096.5
16 Maternity Length of Stay 2.50% $ 4,213.3
17 Qualifying Community 
Health Centers 2.90% $ 4,998.6
18 Mental Health Programs 3.00% $ 5,096.8
19 Primary Care Programs 3.30% $ 5,619.7
20 Phase-Down of Quick Pay 3.70% $ 6,300.6
21 CHIP-KidsCare 5.40% $ 9,251.1
22 $10 M Hospital
Reimbursement 5.80% $ 10,000.0
23 Premium Sharing Project 11.80% $ 20,400.0
24 Unspent 51.90% $ 89,210.6
Expenditures in 000’s Source: JLBC
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TOBACCO TAX MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT FUNDS – FY 2000
Total Funds Available: $172,254.6
Total Expenditures: $88,265.5
1 DHS Health Crisis Fund <0.25% $ 21.0
2 Ajo Health Services <0.25% $ 95.0
3 Rural PCP Loan Repay
Program <0.25% $ 139.0
4 Nonrenal Disease 
Management <0.25% $ 208.0
5 Renal Disease Management <0.25% $ 260.0
6 Telemedicine <0.25% $ 260.0
7 Premium Sharing Project <0.25% $ 400.0
8 DES Aging and Adult
Administration <0.50% $ 500.0
9 Detoxification Services <0.50% $ 520.0
10 Evaluations <1.00% $ 854.2
11 CHIP Direct Services <1.00% $ 1,000.0
12 HIV/AIDS Drug Assistance
Program (ADAP) <1.00% $ 1,000.0
13 HIV/AIDS Treatment <1.00% $ 1,229.9
14 Maternity Length of Stay 1.40% $ 2,485.8
15 Primary Care Capital
Construction 1.40% $ 2,500.0
16 Public Health Education 1.60% $ 2,777.8
17 Psychotropic Medications –
One-Time Allocation 1.70% $ 3,000.0
18 Organ Transplants 2.00% $ 3,590.0
19 Community Health Centers 2.30% $ 4,000.0
20 Offset Loss in Federal 
Funding 2.60% $ 4,542.2
21 Psychotropic Medications
for SMI Non-Title XIX 2.80% $ 5,000.0
22 Mental Health Programs 3.00% $ 5,200.0
23 Qualifying Community
Health Centers 3.00% $ 5,200.0
24 FY 2000 Medical Inflation 3.00% $ 5,276.0
25 Primary Care Programs 3.50% $ 6,240.0
26 Phase-Down of Quick Pay 3.90% $ 6,794.6
27 $10 M Hospital
Reimbursement 5.70% $ 10,000.0
28 CHIP-KidsCare 8.60% $ 15,172.0
29 Unspent 50.00% $ 83,989.1
Expenditures in 000’s Source: JLBC
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TOBACCO TAX MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT FUNDS – FY 2001
Total Funds Available: $165,961.0
Total Expenditures: $77,258.1
1 Rural PCP Loan Repay
Program <0.25% $ 111.2
2 Nonrenal Disease 
Management <0.25% $ 208.0
3 Renal Disease Management <0.25% $ 260.0
4 DES Aging and Adult
Administration <0.50% $ 500.0
5 Evaluations <1.00% $ 854.2
6 CHIP Direct Services <1.00% $ 1,000.0
7 HIV/AIDS Drug Assistance
Program (ADAP) <1.00% $ 1,000.0
8 HIV/AIDS Treatment <1.00% $ 1,349.6
9 Public Health Education 1.40% $ 2,341.5
10 Maternity Length of Stay 1.50% $ 2,572.8
11 Psychotropic Medications
One-Time Allocation 1.80% $ 3,000.0
12 Organ Transplants 2.20% $ 3,590.0
13 Community Health Centers 2.40% $ 4,000.0
14 Offset Loss in Federal 
Funding 2.70% $ 4,542.2
15 Mental Health Programs 3.10% $ 5,200.0
16 Qualifying Community
Health Centers 3.10% $ 5,200.0
17 Medical Inflation 3.20% $ 5,276.0
18 Primary Care Programs 3.80% $ 6,240.0
19 Phase-Down of Quick Pay
Discount 4.90% $ 8,206.7
20 $10 M Hospital
Reimbursement 6.00% $ 10,000.0
21 CHIP-KidsCare 7.10% $ 11,805.9
22 Unspent 53.50% $ 88,702.9
Expenditures in 000’s Source: JLBC
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APPENDIX F-6
Projected based on current legislation.
TOBACCO TAX MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT FUNDS – FY 2002
Total Funds Available: $169,880.6
Total Expenditures: $77,259.9
1 Rural PCP Loan Repay
Program <0.25% $ 111.2
2 Nonrenal Disease 
Management <0.25% $ 208.0
3 Renal Disease Management <0.25% $ 260.0
4 DES Aging and Adult
Administration <0.50% $ 500.0
5 Public Health Education 0.50% $ 753.0
6 Evaluations <1.00% $ 854.2
7 CHIP Direct Services <1.00% $ 1,000.0
8 HIV/AIDS Drug Assistance
Program (ADAP) <1.00% $ 1,000.0
9 HIV/AIDS Treatment <1.00% $ 1,349.6
10 Maternity Length of Stay 1.50% $ 2,572.8
11 Psychotropic Medications
One-Time Allocation 1.80% $ 3,000.0
12 Organ Transplants 2.10% $ 3,590.0
13 Community Health Centers 2.40% $ 4,000.0
14 Offset Loss in Federal 
Funding 2.70% $ 4,542.2
15 Mental Health Programs 3.10% $ 5,200.0
16 Qualifying Community
Health Centers 3.10% $ 5,200.0
17 Medical Inflation 3.10% $ 5,276.0
18 Primary Care Programs 3.70% $ 6,240.0
19 Phase-Down of Quick Pay 4.80% $ 8,206.7
20 $10 M Hospital
Reimbursement 5.90% $ 10,000.0
21 CHIP-KidsCare 7.9% $ 13,396.2
22 Unspent 54.50% $ 92,620.7
Expenditures in 000’s Source: JLBC
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APPENDIX F-7
Projected based on current legislation.
TOBACCO TAX MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT FUNDS – FY 2003
Total Funds Available: $172,430.2
Total Expenditures: $77,846.7
1 Rural PCP Loan Repayment <0.25% $ 111.2
2 Nonrenal Disease 
Management <0.25% $ 208.0
3 Renal Disease Management <0.25% $ 260.0
4 DES Aging and Adult
Administration <0.50% $ 500.0
5 Public Health Education <0.50% $ 670.0
6 Evaluations <1.00% $ 854.2
7 CHIP Direct Services <1.00% $ 1,000.0
8 HIV/AIDS Drug Assistance
Program (ADAP) <1.00% $ 1,000.0
9 HIV/AIDS Treatment <1.00% $ 1,349.6
10 Maternity Length of Stay 1.50% $ 2,572.8
11 Psychotropic Medications
One-Time Allocation 1.70% $ 3,000.0
12 Organ Transplants 2.10% $ 3,590.0
13 Community Health Centers 2.30% $ 4,000.0
14 Offset Loss in Federal 
Funding 2.60% $ 4,542.2
15 Mental Health Programs 3.00% $ 5,200.0
16 Qualifying Community
Health Centers 3.00% $ 5,200.0
17 Medical Inflation 3.10% $ 5,276.0
18 Primary Care Programs 3.60% $ 6,240.0
19 Phase-Down of Quick Pay 4.80% $ 8,206.7
20 $10 M Hospital
Reimbursement 5.80% $ 10,000.0
21 CHIP-KidsCare 8.20% $ 14,066.0
22 Unspent 54.90% $ 94,583.5
Expenditures in 000’s Source: JLBC
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APPENDIX F-8
Projected based on current legislation.
TOBACCO TAX MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT FUNDS – FY 2004
Total Funds Available: $173,279.7
Total Expenditures: $77,880.0
1 Rural PCP Loan Repayment <0.25% $ 111.2
2 Nonrenal Disease 
Management <0.25% $ 208.0
3 Renal Disease Management <0.25% $ 260.0
4 DES Aging and Adult
Administration <0.50% $ 500.0
5 Evaluations <1.00% $ 854.2
6 CHIP Direct Services <1.00% $ 1,000.0
7 HIV/AIDS Drug Assistance
Program (ADAP) <1.00% $ 1,000.0
8 HIV/AIDS Treatment <1.00% $ 1,349.6
9 Maternity Length of Stay 1.70% $ 2,572.8
10 Psychotropic Medications
One-Time Allocation 1.70% $ 3,000.0
11 Organ Transplants 2.10% $ 3,590.0
12 Community Health Centers 2.30% $ 4,000.0
13 Offset Loss in Federal 
Funding 2.60% $ 4,542.2
14 Mental Health Programs 3.00% $ 5,200.0
15 Qualifying Community
Health Centers 3.00% $ 5,200.0
16 Medical Inflation 3.00% $ 5,276.0
17 Primary Care Programs 3.60% $ 6,240.0
18 Phase-Down of Quick Pay
Discount 4.80% $ 8,206.7
19 $10 M Hospital
Reimbursement 5.80% $ 10,000.0
20 CHIP-KidsCare 8.50% $ 14,769.3
21 Unspent 55.10% $ 95,399.7
Expenditures in 000’s Source: JLBC
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APPENDIX F-9
Projected based on current legislation.
TOBACCO TAX MEDICALLY NEEDY ACCOUNT FUNDS – FY 2005
Total Funds Available: $172,971.3
Total Expenditures: $78,618.5
1 Rural PCP Loan Repayment <0.25% $ 111.2
2 Nonrenal Disease 
Management <0.25% $ 208.0
3 Renal Disease Management <0.25% $ 260.0
4 DES Aging and Adult
Administration <0.50% $ 500.0
5 Evaluations <1.00% $ 854.2
6 CHIP Direct Services <1.00% $ 1,000.0
7 HIV/AIDS Drug Assistance
Program (ADAP) <1.00% $ 1,000.0
8 HIV/AIDS Treatment <1.00% $ 1,349.6
9 Maternity Length of Stay 1.50% $ 2,572.6
10 Psychotropic Medications
One-Time Allocation 1.70% $ 3,000.0
11 Organ Transplants 2.10% $ 3,590.0
12 Community Health Centers 2.30% $ 4,000.0
13 Offset Loss in Federal 
Funding 2.60% $ 4,542.2
14 Mental Health Programs 3.00% $ 5,200.0
15 Qualifying Community
Health Centers 3.00% $ 5,200.0
16 Medical Inflation 3.10% $ 5,276.0
17 Primary Care Programs 3.60% $ 6,240.0
18 Phase-Down of Quick Pay 4.70% $ 8,206.7
19 $10 M Hospital
Reimbursement 5.80% $ 10,000.0
20 CHIP-KidsCare 9.00% $ 15,507.8
21 Unspent 54.6% $ 94,352.8
Expenditures in 000’s Source: JLBC
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APPENDIX F-10
Projected based on current legislation.
SST. LUKE’S CHARITABLE HEALTH TRUST
2999 N. 44th Street
Suite 530
Phoenix, AZ 85018
Phone: 602-808-8900
Fax: 602-808-9600
E-mail: sltrust@primenet.com
Web: www.sltrust.com
MORRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
COLLEGE OF PUBLIC PROGRAMS
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
P.O. Box 874405
Tempe, AZ 85287-4405
Phone: 480-965-4525
Fax: 480-965-9219
www.asu.edu/copp/morrison
